T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Network-Exposed Cluster Gateway Lacks Documented Access Controls
- Content
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--agent # Task an Worker Node senden openclaw cluster gateway task --target --command "" # Relay Node konfigurieren openclaw cluster gateway relay --enable --node ``` ```json // cluster-gateway.config.json { "gateway": { "id": "node-1", "role": "hub", "bind": "0.0.0.0", "port": 18789 }, "nodes": [ {"id": "node-2", "role": "worker", "host": "10.10.0.2"}, {"id": "node-3", "role": "relay", "host": "10.10.0.3"}, {"id": "node-4", "role": "worker", "host": "10.10.0.4"} ], "messaging": { "enabled": false, "provider": "pending" } } ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented gateway binds to `0.0.0.0`, making it reachable through every network interface unless an external firewall restricts access. The same gateway provides security-sensitive orchestration operations, including deploying sub-agents, enabling relay nodes, and sending task strings through the `--command` argument. The documentation does not specify authentication, authorization, transport encryption, per-node identity verification, command allowlisting, or network-level restrictions. Accepting unrestricted task strings is particularly dangerous if the implementation forwards them to a command interpreter or otherwise executes them without strict validation. Because the reviewed project contains only documentation and no gateway implementation, the presence or absence of controls in the underlying `openclaw` service cannot be verified. The vulnerability applies if the documented configuration is deployed without protections supplied elsewhere. ### Att ...[truncated 1526 chars]- Remediation
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