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Security audit

Skill Review

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is coherent and disclosed, but it asks a high-privilege agent to modify other installed skills by default without clear user confirmation or scope limits.

Review before installing. Use this only for trusted local skills, preferably in a read-only review mode first. Before allowing it to write, require an explicit diff, confirmed target path, backup location, and confirmation that every changed file is inside the intended skill directory.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:17
Finding

Default Cross-Skill Modification Without Explicit Authorization

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:17-40
Vulnerability Type: Excessive permissions and unauthorized modification of local skill files
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
## Typical ownership / permission level
- This skill is typically used by the **`master`** agent.
- It often requires **higher local permissions** because it may inspect and modify:
  - `SKILL.md`
  - `references/`
  - `scripts/`
  - other local skill folders

## Core rules
- Prefer **thin markdown + heavier scripts**.
- If a step can be scripted, it should usually be scripted.
- If no extra requirements exist, prefer executing scripts instead of repeatedly re-explaining a process in chat.
- `SKILL.md` should hold rules, boundaries, and confirmation points.
- `scripts/` should hold mechanical checks, copying, verification, and repeatable operations.
- `references/` should stay lightweight.
- After review, the default is: **back up first, then modify, then show evidence**.

## Standard flow
1. Read the target `SKILL.md`
2. Inspect `scripts/` and `references/`
3. Identify verbosity, duplication, and non-scripted mechanical steps
4. Back up the target skill files
5. Improve the skill structure
6. Show backup paths, changes made, and final evidence

Technical Analysis

The skill declares that it may operate with higher local permissions and modify files in other skill directories. It then makes modification the default action after review, without requiring explicit user approval for the proposed changes.

This violates least-privilege and authorization-boundary principles. A review task only requires read access, while modification should be treated as a separate, confirmation-gated operation. Creating a backup reduces recovery risk but does not authorize a write.

The instructions do not define:

  • An allowlist of permitted skill roots.
  • Canonical-path validation for t ...[truncated 2028 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Make review strictly read-only by default. Separate assessment from remediation into distinct operating modes.
  2. Require explicit user confirmation immediately before any backup or write operation.
  3. Display the canonical target path, files to be changed, proposed diff, and backup destination before requesting confirmation.
  4. Restrict eligible targets to an explicit allowlist of approved skill roots.
  5. Resolve paths with a canonicalization mechanism and verify that every destination remains inside the approved root.
  6. Reject symbolic links or verify both source and resolved destination to prevent link-based path escapes.
  7. Run the review phase with read-only permissions and grant narrowly scoped write access only after approval.
  8. Write changes atomically, preserve file ownership and permissions, and verify the resulting content.
  9. Record the confirmed scope and changed files in an audit log.
  10. Update the workflow to state: “Review and propose changes; modify only after explicit confirmation.”
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared description promises a workflow that includes backing up the skill and improving it after review. The actual code only performs read-only analysis: it validates the target, prints counts and file listings, and issues heuristic warnings. This is related to review of token efficiency/scriptability boundaries, so the general domain matches, but key promised actions—backup and improvement—are absent. Therefore the description overstates the implemented behavior in a materially important way.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The input field allows a very broad target such as any skill path or skill name, while the skill is intended for a high-permission master agent that may inspect and modify local files. Broad activation scope increases the risk of operating on unintended paths, ambiguous targets, or attacker-influenced inputs that could steer review or modification actions beyond the expected skill boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Line L05 defines the output entirely in Chinese, which implies a fixed language requirement. The file does not state that language is user-selectable or that Chinese output is required for a justified region-specific purpose, creating a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This markdown file contains all user-facing checklist items in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. That creates a natural-language policy concern because it effectively forces a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.