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Security audit

fswe

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a Markdown-only full-stack guidance skill, but several production-facing templates show unsafe auth, deletion, feature-flag, WebSocket token, and CI patterns that users should review before installing.

Review generated code before using it in production. In particular, remove client-controlled role assignment from public registration, require explicit authorization and audit logging for destructive routes and feature-flag changes, avoid putting auth tokens in URLs, and pin CI actions to reviewed commit SHAs with least-privilege workflow permissions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
references/api-development/SKILL.md:69
Finding

Unauthenticated User Registration Allows Administrative Role Assignment

Content
View full analysis
{ try { const user = await userService.create(req.body) res.status(201).json(user) } catch (err) { next(err) } } ) ``` ```typescript export const createUserSchema = z.object({ body: z.object({ email: z.string().email('Invalid email format'), name: z.string().min(1, 'Name is required').max(100), password: z.string() .min(8, 'Password must be at least 8 characters') .regex(/[A-Z]/, 'Password must contain uppercase') .regex(/[0-9]/, 'Password must contain number'), role: z.enum(['user', 'admin']).default('user'), }), }) ``` ### Technical Analysis The example exposes `POST /users` without authentication or authorization middleware. Its validation schema permits the caller to submit either `user` or `admin` as the account role. The complete validated request body is then passed directly to `userService.create()`. A default value of `user` does not prevent exploitation because it is only applied when the caller omits the field. An attacker can explicitly provide `"role": "admin"`, which passes schema validation. This is an insecure mass-assignment pattern and violates the rule that authorization-sensitive properties must be assigned exclusively by trusted server-side logic. Because this Skill is intended to provide reusable production templates, applications adopting the example without correction may inherit the vulnerability. ### Attack Path 1. An unauthenticated attacker identifies the public `POST /users` endpoint. 2. The attacker submits a request such as: ```json { "email": "attacker@example.com", "na ...[truncated 843 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/websocket-realtime/SKILL.md:14
Finding

WebSocket Guidance Permits Authentication Tokens in Query Strings

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/ci-cd-pipelines/SKILL.md:34
Finding

GitHub Actions Templates Execute Dependencies Referenced by Mutable Version Tags

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (18)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The example exposes a destructive DELETE /users/:id route with authentication only and no authorization or ownership check shown. In a skill meant to teach API development, this pattern can normalize unsafe deletion logic and could lead implementers to ship an IDOR-style or privilege-escalation vulnerability where any authenticated user can delete arbitrary accounts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-development/SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

md
}
)

// DELETE /users/:id
router.delete('/users/:id',
  authenticate,
  async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/http-grpc/SKILL.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

POST /api/v1/users → Create GET /api/v1/users/:id → Read PATCH /api/v1/users/:id → Update DELETE /api/v1/users/:id → Delete

text

### Status Codes

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/legacy-migration/SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

router.get('/users', userController.findAll)

// Phase 3: Remove legacy dependency // DELETE /users from PHP

text

## Risk Mapping

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The changelog states that the skill can auto-select routing based on input keywords, but provides no boundaries on which inputs trigger routing, how routing decisions are constrained, or whether user confirmation is required. In an agent skill, ambiguous activation logic can cause unintended module invocation, broaden the attack surface for prompt-trigger manipulation, and lead to behavior the user did not explicitly request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README says the skill 'automatically routes to the right module based on your input keywords' but does not specify which keywords trigger which modules or what inputs should not activate routing. For a markdown file, this creates an ambiguous activation condition that could cause unintended module selection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The phrase 'English-only' is a natural-language locale restriction. Although the parameters table lists multiple language options, this line explicitly imposes a single language without opt-in or justification, which conflicts with the policy against forced language constraints.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The markdown defines activation/routing based on generic keywords such as "test," "slow," "service," "debug," "production," and "ownership," many of which overlap with common engineering conversation. The file does not provide exclusion conditions or negative examples to clarify when these keywords should not trigger a module, making the trigger scope ambiguous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-development/SKILL.md (reported line 268)May include surrounding context.

md
description: API for EazyCam webcam service

servers:
  - url: https://api.eazycam.com/v1
  - url: http://localhost:3000/v1

paths:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The example exposes a state-changing kill-switch action over a GET route and allows toggling feature flags based solely on a query parameter, with no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or operator confirmation shown. In skill context, this is more dangerous because it is presented as reusable implementation guidance, so readers may copy an insecure administrative control path directly into production systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The natural-language note says mixed Indonesian/English was removed in favor of full English, which suggests a forced language choice. There is no indication here that users can opt into another language or that the English-only constraint is justified by a region-specific requirement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes a DELETE /users/:id example that performs user deletion, but the surrounding documentation does not warn readers that the operation is destructive or irreversible. For markdown files, the skill description should disclose behaviors that may affect user data or system integrity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The OpenAPI section specifies that GET /users returns an object with data and meta fields, indicating a standardized paginated response. In the controller example, the same endpoint sends res.json(users) directly, which contradicts the documented response shape rather than merely omitting detail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The checklist explicitly calls for role-based authorization, and the file defines an authorize middleware for that purpose. However, the route examples only use authenticate, so the documented intent around authorization is not reflected in the shown implementation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The markdown specifies a language parameter with default en, which can amount to a language preference being imposed unless the invoking system explicitly asks the user. Under the policy, language constraints should be opt-in or clearly justified; this file provides a fixed default but no instruction to obtain user choice first.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The example shows logging a user identifier directly, which can normalize inclusion of potentially sensitive identifiers in application logs without any caution about minimization, masking, or retention controls. While a user ID is not always highly sensitive by itself, logs are often widely accessible and long-lived, so exposing identifiers can increase privacy risk and aid correlation of user activity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The parameters specify language with a default of en and allowed values en, id, which sets a specific language by default. Under the policy, forcing a language without explicit user opt-in can be a natural-language policy issue unless the locale constraint is clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The parameter table sets language default to en while only listing en, id, which imposes a language choice unless the user overrides it. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a natural-language locale violation when no justification is provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Line L26 instructs sending the literal 心跳, which is Chinese text, while the parameters indicate a default language of en and only list en, id. This introduces a language/locale inconsistency in the skill guidance without documenting why non-English output is required or giving the user a choice at that point.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.