T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:36- Finding
Mutable Remote Repository Is Downloaded and Executed Without Integrity Verification
- Content
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&1 | tail -3 ``` ```bash cd ~/.muse/muse-catch # Kill the previous process, if present pkill -f "python3 server.py" 2>/dev/null sleep 1 # Start in the background nohup python3 server.py > /tmp/muse-server.log 2>&1 & sleep 3 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill clones or updates the mutable `main` branch of an external repository and then immediately executes `server.py`. The repository contents are not included in the audited artifact. No immutable commit reference, cryptographic checksum, signature verification, or source review is required before execution. Consequently, the effective executable payload can change after this Skill has been reviewed. The repository owner, a compromised maintainer account, or an attacker who gains control of the repository could replace the expected application with arbitrary Python code. The `git pull origin main` update path also means an existing installation can silently acquire a new payload during a later invocation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises or otherwise obtains write access to `KevPH2026/muse-catch`. 2. The attacker commits malicious code to the mutable `main` branch, particularly in `server.py` or an imported module. 3. A user invokes the Muse installation Skill. 4. The Agent clones the repository or pulls the modified branch. 5. The Agent executes `python3 server.py` through `nohup`. 6. The malicious payload runs under the Agent or user's operating-system account. ### Impact Assessment The downloaded payload can obtain the same privileges as the invoking user. Subject to the user's operating-syst ...[truncated 459 chars]- Remediation
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