T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/search_news.sh:16- Finding
API Key Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/search_news.sh, lines 16–20
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential exposure through process arguments
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
bash curl -X POST --location 'https://mkapi2.dfcfs.com/finskillshub/api/claw/news-search' \ --header 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --header "apikey:$APIKEY" \ --data "{\"query\":\"$QUERY\"}"Technical Analysis
The script expands
MX_APIKEYdirectly into acurlcommand-line argument. While the request is running, the resulting header argument may be exposed through local process-inspection interfaces such aspsor/proc/<pid>/cmdline, depending on the operating system and its process visibility configuration.Although the key is transmitted to the declared HTTPS service and is not hardcoded in the repository, placing it in the process argument vector unnecessarily broadens its exposure. Exploitation requires the attacker to have local process-observation capabilities while the script is executing.
Attack Path
- A user exports a valid credential as
MX_APIKEY. - The user invokes
scripts/search_news.shwith a query. - The shell expands
$APIKEYinto thecurlargument vector. - A local attacker or monitoring process observes the active command through process-inspection facilities.
- The attacker extracts the value from the
apikeyheader argument. - The attacker reuses the credential to submit requests to the financial-news API until the key is revoked, expires, or is otherwise restricted.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation can disclose the configured API key. The attacker may obtain the same API-level authorization granted to that key, potentially consuming its quota, issuing unauthorized searches, causing service charges, or triggering rate limits.
This issue does not by itself provide operating-system privilege escalation, arbitrary command execution ...[truncated 268 chars]
- A user exports a valid credential as
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Do not place secrets directly in command-line arguments.
- Supply the sensitive header through a permission-restricted temporary curl configuration file or another mechanism that does not expose the secret in the process argument vector.
- Create temporary files with restrictive permissions, such as mode
0600, and install anEXITtrap to remove them reliably. - Ensure debug tracing is disabled around credential handling; shell tracing with
set -xwould expose the key in logs. - Apply server-side least privilege, rate limits, short credential lifetimes, rotation, and revocation controls.
- Rotate the key if there is reason to believe it has already been exposed.
One possible hardening pattern is:
bash config_file=$(mktemp) chmod 600 "$config_file" trap 'rm -f "$config_file"' EXIT { printf 'header = "Content-Type: application/json"\n' printf 'header = "apikey: %s"\n' "$APIKEY" } > "$config_file" payload=$(jq -n --arg query "$QUERY" '{query: $query}') curl --location \ --config "$config_file" \ --request POST \ --data "$payload" \ 'https://mkapi2.dfcfs.com/finskillshub/api/claw/news-search'Using
jqalso ensures that quotes, backslashes, and control characters in the query are encoded as valid JSON.
