Security audit

Jinko

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent travel CLI guide, but users should treat API keys and traveler details carefully when using its booking commands.

Install only if you trust the Jinko CLI package and are comfortable with a global npm executable. Prefer OAuth where possible, avoid putting real API keys or traveler details directly in shell history or shared logs, and confirm before sending traveler/contact data or opening a payment checkout link.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:11
Finding: Unpinned Global Installation of an Unreviewed Executable Dependency
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:35
Finding: API Key Exposure Through Command-Line Arguments and Opaque Persistent Configuration
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:203
Finding: Traveler Personal Data Exposed Through Process Arguments
Content: View full analysis
` | Travelers as JSON array | | `--contact ` | Contact as JSON `{email, phone}` | ``` ```json [{ "first_name": "John", "last_name": "Doe", "date_of_birth": "1990-05-15", "gender": "MALE", "passenger_type": "ADULT" }] ``` ```bash jinko trip --trip-id trip_xyz --travelers '[{"first_name":"John","last_name":"Doe","date_of_birth":"1990-05-15","gender":"MALE","passenger_type":"ADULT"}]' --contact '{"email":"john@example.com","phone":"+1-555-123-4567"}' ``` The same command pattern is prescribed in the workflow at line 284: ```bash jinko trip --trip-id --travelers '' --contact '' ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented booking workflow places traveler and contact records directly in command-line arguments. With real booking data, these arguments can contain names, dates of birth, gender, email addresses, phone numbers, passenger classifications, and trip identifiers. Command arguments are an unsuitable channel for sensitive personal data because they may be retained in shell history and execution logs or observed through local process-inspection facilities while the process is running. Agent frameworks and CI systems may also persist complete tool calls. Shell quoting prevents ordinary shell expansion but does not prevent argument disclosure through these channels. The example values are synthetic, and the audited file itself does not expose a real traveler. The vulnerability occurs when the documented pattern is used with actual customer information. ### Attack Path 1. A user constructs the documented `jinko trip` command using a real traveler's identity and contact details. 2. The shell, Agent runtime, terminal recorder, command-auditing system, or CI platform stores the complete in ...[truncated 959 chars]
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The skill guides the agent through trip creation and booking steps that require transmitting personally identifiable information and travel details, including traveler names, dates of birth, gender, contact information, and booking-related tokens, but it does not instruct the agent to warn the user, obtain explicit consent, or minimize sensitive data handling. In an agent context, this increases the risk of unexpected collection or disclosure of personal/travel data to third-party services and may cause privacy, compliance, or trust issues even if the CLI itself is legitimate.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.