T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:6- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Executes with Access to Financial Credentials and Trading Functions
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:6-9; related execution and authentication workflow atsetup.md:14-22
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency with access to sensitive OAuth tokens and financial operations
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:6-9:yaml install: - kind: node package: robinhood-for-agents bins: [robinhood-for-agents]setup.md:14-22:bash ### Step 2: Browser Login ```bash bunx robinhood-for-agents loginThis opens Chrome to the real Robinhood website:
- Chrome opens to robinhood.com/login
- User enters email and password
- Robinhood handles MFA natively (push notification, SMS, etc.)
- Token captured automatically and saved securely
- Chrome closes when login is complete
text ### Technical Analysis The Skill installs and executes `robinhood-for-agents` without specifying an exact package version or integrity hash. The `bunx` authentication command may therefore resolve and execute whichever package version the registry currently serves. This dependency occupies a highly privileged trust position. According to the documented workflow, it intercepts Robinhood OAuth traffic, captures an authenticated token, stores or restores that token through the operating-system keychain, reads sensitive financial information, and exposes methods capable of placing or cancelling stock, option, and cryptocurrency orders. The audited project contains only Markdown instructions and API documentation; it does not include the dependency source, a lockfile, package integrity metadata, or a reproducible build record. Consequently, the dependency's implementation, outbound destinations, token handling, and enforcement of order safeguards cannot be verified from the audited artifact. A malicious or compromised future release could execute before any reviewed version boundary protects the user. Network access and possession o ...[truncated 2470 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
robinhood-for-agentsto an exact, reviewed version rather than resolving the latest registry release. - Commit a lockfile containing cryptographic integrity values and require frozen-lockfile installation so dependency resolution cannot drift.
- Prefer a vendored or otherwise locally reviewable implementation for the authentication and trading client, especially the browser interception and keychain code.
- Publish signed release artifacts, package provenance, and reproducible build instructions. Verify signatures and integrity before execution.
- Audit all transitive dependencies and use automated dependency monitoring for publisher changes, known vulnerabilities, and unexpected release activity.
- Restrict outbound network access to explicitly documented Robinhood domains during authentication and API use. Deny arbitrary third-party destinations where the execution environment supports egress controls.
- Separate authentication, read-only portfolio access, and trade execution into distinct capabilities. Do not expose order methods to workflows that only require research or portfolio retrieval.
- Enforce confirmation and account-selection requirements in a trusted wrapper outside the third-party dependency, rather than relying only on Markdown instructions.
- Avoid printing complete account-profile, account-number, or portfolio responses unless specifically required. Redact sensitive fields before presenting results or retaining logs.
- Document token revocation procedures and advise users to revoke the Robinhood session immediately if dependency integrity is uncertain.
- Pin
