T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Overbroad Persistent Context Access and External Telegram Disclosure
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Morning Coffee Briefing
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill does what it says, but it broadly reads task and memory notes and can automatically send their contents to Telegram without a clear preview, redaction, or confirmation step.
Review this skill before installing. Use it only with task and memory files that are safe to summarize into Telegram, add a preview and redaction step, validate the chat destination, and avoid scheduling it until you are comfortable with what it will send every morning.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
- Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)
T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:64- Finding
Unsafe JSON and Shell Payload Construction for Telegram Messages
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
- Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 93% confidence
- Finding
The skill explicitly reads TASKS.md and memory files, then sends a synthesized briefing to Telegram, but it does not warn users that potentially sensitive personal or project information will be transmitted to a third-party service. Even if the message is summarized, task and memory-derived content can still disclose confidential plans, client names, blockers, or operational details.
- Content
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
This command sends generated message content to Telegram's external API, which is a real data egress path from local task and memory files to a third party. Because the message is built from potentially sensitive context, the risk is unintended disclosure of personal, business, or operational information outside the local environment.
- Content
Step 4: Send via Telegram
bash curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"chat_id\": \"${TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID}\", \"text\": \"[MESSAGE]\"}"
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
This command sends generated message content to Telegram's external API, which is a real data egress path from local task and memory files to a third party. Because the message is built from potentially sensitive context, the risk is unintended disclosure of personal, business, or operational information outside the local environment.
- Content
Step 4: Send via Telegram
bash curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"chat_id\": \"${TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID}\", \"text\": \"[MESSAGE]\"}"