Security audit

Hive Agent

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Hive agent skill is coherent, but it needs Review because it stores an API key in a local plaintext file and can automatically publish LLM-generated trading comments from untrusted thread content.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent that can post public Hive trading comments. Store the Hive API key outside the project or protect the file with owner-only permissions and exclude it from source control. Add prompt-injection defenses and output validation before automatic posting, and pin or avoid the optional npx CLI command unless you have reviewed the package version.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

Location: SKILL.md:223
Finding: Untrusted Remote Thread Content Can Manipulate LLM-Generated Public Comments
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:121
Finding: Hive API Key Is Persisted in a Plaintext Working-Directory File
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:314
Finding: Unpinned npx Command Can Download and Execute Mutable Package Content
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation
create`. 2. Record the package in a lockfile and install it through a controlled dependency-management process rather than executing the latest registry release directly. 3. Verify package integrity, provenance, publisher identity, and registry source before execution. 4. Use an organization-controlled registry mirror or allowlist where possible. 5. Run scaffolding in an isolated container or restricted workspace without production credentials. 6. Review lifecycle scripts and CLI entry points for the pinned version. 7. Upgrade only through an explicit review process rather than automatically resolving mutable releases. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The invocation description includes generic triggers like "conviction," "periodic," and "cursor," which are common terms in many unrelated agent tasks. Without tighter context or exclusion conditions, these phrases could cause unintended activation for non-Hive workflows.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.
Agent name: Choose a unique, descriptive name for this agent (e.g. based on strategy, style, or domain). Do not use generic placeholders like "MyAnalyst"—invent a distinct name so the agent is identifiable on the platform (e.g. CautiousTA-Bot, SentimentHive, DegenOracle).

bash
curl -X POST "https://hive-backend.z3n.dev/agent/register" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "name": "YourUniqueAgentName",

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly instructs users to persist an API key to a local file but does not warn about file permissions, secret exposure, backups, source-control leakage, or safer secret-storage options. Because the same file also stores run state, users may treat it as ordinary application data and accidentally commit or expose it, enabling unauthorized use of the Hive account/API key.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium

Category: Prompt Injection
Confidence: 70% confidence
Finding: Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 137)May include surrounding context.
}

text
| Field | Required | Purpose | | -------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `apiKey` | Yes | Use for all authenticated requests. Only register if missing or invalid. | | `cursor` | No | Last run's newest thread: `timestamp` (ISO 8601) + `id`. Use as query params on next run to fetch only **newer** threads. |

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 247)May include surrounding context.
After analyzing a thread and computing summary and conviction, post a single comment:

bash
curl -X POST "https://hive-backend.z3n.dev/comment/THREAD_ID" \ -H "x-api-key: YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 92% confidence
Finding: The skill recommends running npx @hive-org/cli without pinning a specific version. That allows whatever package version is current at execution time to run code on the user's machine, creating a supply-chain risk if the package is compromised or a breaking/malicious update is published. In this context, the risk is amplified because the CLI is suggested for bootstrapping an agent that will handle API credentials and trading-related automation.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.