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Security audit

ChessGuardian

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill mostly does what it says, but its board-snapshot workflow can run an unpinned Playwright package through npx, so it should be reviewed before installation.

Install only if you trust the ChessGuardian endpoint and are comfortable with the skill making network requests and running local bot processes. Before using board snapshots, prefer installing and pinning Playwright in a controlled environment instead of allowing `npx` to resolve packages at runtime; also restrict custom `--url` use to trusted ChessGuardian instances.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:70
Finding

Unpinned Playwright Package Execution Through npx

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/autoplay_minimax.py:250
Finding

Missing HTTP Request Timeouts in Minimax Autoplay Client

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/autoplay_stockfish.py:38
Finding

Missing HTTP Request Timeouts in Stockfish Autoplay Client

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (11)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use both network access and shell execution, but it declares no tool scope or permission boundaries. That means an orchestrator may expose broader capabilities than intended, increasing the chance of arbitrary command execution, external requests, or unsafe chaining when the skill is invoked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says to use the skill for specific chess actions and then broadens scope to 'analyze a chess position, or any chess-related interaction.' That catch-all phrasing is ambiguous and could cause unintended invocation on ordinary chess discussion rather than only when the user wants API-backed gameplay or board operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Using npx playwright without a pinned version allows the runtime to resolve whatever package version is current or otherwise available at execution time. This creates a supply-chain risk and undermines reproducibility, because behavior or dependencies could change unexpectedly and potentially introduce malicious or vulnerable code into the skill's execution path.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tainted flow: 'game_id' from requests.post (line 272, network input) → requests.get (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_minimax.py (reported line 279)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_state(base_url, game_id):
    resp = requests.get(f"{base_url}/api/live/{game_id}")
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json()

Tainted flow: 'game_id' from requests.post (line 272, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_minimax.py (reported line 285)May include surrounding context.

python
def make_move(base_url, game_id, move):
    resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/live/{game_id}/move", json={"move": move})
    return resp.json()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_minimax.py (reported line 269)May include surrounding context.

python
def start_new_game(base_url):
    resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/live/start", json={"mode": "ai"})
    resp.raise_for_status()
    data = resp.json()
    game_id = data["id"]

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_stockfish.py (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

python
def start_new_game(base_url):
    resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/live/start", json={"mode": "ai"})
    resp.raise_for_status()
    data = resp.json()
    game_id = data["id"]

Tainted flow: 'game_id' from requests.post (line 40, network input) → requests.get (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_stockfish.py (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_state(base_url, game_id):
    resp = requests.get(f"{base_url}/api/live/{game_id}")
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_minimax.py (reported line 285)May include surrounding context.

python
def make_move(base_url, game_id, move):
    resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/live/{game_id}/move", json={"move": move})
    return resp.json()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_stockfish.py (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

python
def make_move(base_url, game_id, move):
    resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/live/{game_id}/move", json={"move": move})
    return resp.json()

Tainted flow: 'game_id' from requests.post (line 40, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/autoplay_stockfish.py (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

python
def make_move(base_url, game_id, move):
    resp = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/live/{game_id}/move", json={"move": move})
    return resp.json()