Security audit
Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk
The morning briefing workflow is mostly coherent, but it ships broader Fulcra and Attio write/delete tools than a read-only briefing skill needs.
Review before installing. This is not malicious on the evidence provided, but install it only if you trust the publisher with sensitive Fulcra data and are comfortable with the package including extra write-capable CRM/Fulcra utilities. Avoid untrusted FULCRA_API_BASE, ATTIO_API_BASE, FULCRA_CLI_COMMAND, or FULCRA_CONCIERGE_HOME settings, and treat the collector output as private.
candidates = [[*shlex.split(command), "auth", "print-access-token"]]
for cmd in candidates:
try:
token = subprocess.check_output(
cmd,
env=env,
text=True,headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode() or "{}"
return resp.status, json.loads(body)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:env.setdefault("PYTHONUTF8", "1")
cmd = [*shlex.split(CLI_COMMAND, posix=(os.name != "nt")), *args]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=120)
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
return 1, f"CLI invocation failed: {exc}"
if proc.returncode != 0:data[name] = value
# Write atomically-ish and restrict perms before writing the value.
tmp = SECRETS_PATH.with_suffix(".tmp")
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
json.dump(data, fh, indent=2)
try:
os.chmod(tmp, 0o600)headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
req = urllib.request.Request(API_BASE + path, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as response:
body = response.read()
return response.status, body.decode() if body else ""
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:def run_cli(args: list[str]) -> tuple[int, str]:
env = os.environ.copy()
env.setdefault("PYTHONUTF8", "1")
cmd = [*shlex.split(CLI_COMMAND, posix=(os.name != "nt")), *args]
try:def access_token() -> str:
env_token = os.environ.get("FULCRA_ACCESS_TOKEN")
if env_token:
return env_token.strip()if env_token:
return env_token.strip()
env = os.environ.copy()
env["HOME"] = DEFAULT_HOME
command = os.environ.get("FULCRA_CLI_COMMAND", "uv tool run fulcra-api")env.setdefault("PYTHONUTF8", "1")
cmd = [*shlex.split(CLI_COMMAND, posix=(os.name != "nt")), *args]
try:
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=120)
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
return 1, f"CLI invocation failed: {exc}"
if proc.returncode != 0:stdlib-only (urllib) so it runs under any `uv run`/python without extra installs, mirroring the Fulcra annotation helper. It is BOTH a library (import the functions) and a CLI (skills shell out to it). Every write supports --dry-run, and the token is loaded via concierge_secrets (env ATTIO_API_KEY or ~/.fulcra-concierge/secrets.json) and never printed. Attio shapes used (verify against the live API; envelopes are the documented ones):
2. ~/.fulcra-concierge/secrets.json -- the persistent local store. Secrets are never printed. Skills read keys through `get_secret`; they should not open secrets.json themselves. Keeping one loader means one place to harden (file perms, future keychain support) instead of N copies across skills. """ from __future__ import annotations
import os
from pathlib import Path
SECRETS_PATH = Path(os.environ.get("FULCRA_CONCIERGE_HOME", Path.home() / ".fulcra-concierge")) / "secrets.json"
def _load_file() -> dict:def set_secret(name: str, value: str) -> None:
"""Persist a secret into secrets.json (merging with any existing keys) and
lock the file down to the current user. Used by setup helpers, not skills."""
SECRETS_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
data = _load_file()Secrets are never printed. Skills read keys through `get_secret`; they should not open secrets.json themselves. Keeping one loader means one place to harden (file perms, future keychain support) instead of N copies across skills. """ from __future__ import annotations
65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.
No suspicious patterns detected.