Security audit

Agentic Calling

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This Twilio phone and SMS skill is mostly transparent, but it gives an agent broad real-world calling, texting, and recording power without enough built-in safeguards.

Install only if you intentionally want an agent to use your Twilio account for real calls and SMS. Before enabling it, add human approval, recipient allowlists, usage/spend limits, logging, consent rules for recording/transcription, restrictive permissions for any credential file, and avoid passing untrusted message text until the TwiML/Python encoding bug is fixed.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The README explicitly promotes autonomous phone calls and SMS, but it does not warn users about consent requirements, privacy considerations, abuse potential, or billing exposure. In a telephony skill, omission of these guardrails can lead to unauthorized outreach, harassment, regulatory violations, and unexpected charges, especially when used by autonomous agents at scale.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly promotes call recording and transcription but does not warn about consent, legal restrictions, or the privacy implications of capturing third-party communications. In many jurisdictions, recording or transcribing calls without proper notice or consent can create legal, compliance, and privacy harm, especially because agents may use these features autonomously at scale.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: The skill enables autonomous outbound calling and SMS to arbitrary phone numbers but does not include warnings about third-party impact, consent, abuse prevention, or regulatory constraints such as anti-spam and telemarketing rules. This is dangerous because an agent can contact external parties directly, creating harassment, fraud, billing, and reputational risks if misused or misconfigured.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The script enables call recording for appointment reminder calls by passing '--record true', but the visible message played to recipients contains no disclosure that the call may be recorded. Recording individuals without clear notice can create privacy, consent, and regulatory compliance risks, especially in healthcare-adjacent appointment contexts where personal information is involved.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The manifest explicitly advertises autonomous phone calling and SMS capabilities, which can trigger real-world communications, transmit user data to Twilio, and incur account charges without any warning, consent language, or guardrails in the skill metadata. In this context, the omission is security-relevant because telephony actions have immediate external impact and can be abused for spam, privacy violations, or unexpected billing if invoked by an agent without clear user acknowledgment.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: 2. **Configure Twilio Credentials:** Create `~/.clawdbot/twilio-config.json`: ```json { "accountSid": "YOUR_ACCOUNT_SID",
Confidence: 83% confidence
Finding: Create `~/.clawdbot

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: ### 1. Configure Credentials Create a file at `~/.clawdbot/twilio-config.json`: ```json {
Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: Create a file at `~/.clawdbot

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.