T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SECURITY.md:52- Finding
GitHub Token Is Requested with Permissions Beyond the Public Search Requirement
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly does what it says, but it asks users for broader GitHub token access than its public search function appears to need and gives unsafe token-storage guidance.
Review before installing. Use a dedicated short-lived GitHub token with the minimum scopes that actually work for your use case, avoid granting read:org unless you verify it is required, and prefer a temporary environment variable or secret manager over a plaintext .env file. Treat saved candidate results as personal data and follow privacy, anti-spam, and employment-law requirements before contacting anyone.
SECURITY.md:52GitHub Token Is Requested with Permissions Beyond the Public Search Requirement
SECURITY.md:57Persistent Plaintext Token Guidance Relies on a Missing Git Ignore Rule and Does Not Restrict File Permissions
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **需要外部 API 凭证(GitHub Token)**
- 本 skill 使用 GitHub API 搜索开发者
- 需要用户自行申请并配置 GitHub Personal Access Token
- Token 存储在本地 `.env` 文件中(不会上传到 git)
2. **包含 Prompt 模板**
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **需要外部 API 凭证(GitHub Token)**
- 本 skill 使用 GitHub API 搜索开发者
- 需要用户自行申请并配置 GitHub Personal Access Token
- Token 存储在本地 `.env` 文件中(不会上传到 git)
2. **包含 Prompt 模板**
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **需要外部 API 凭证(GitHub Token)**
- 本 skill 使用 GitHub API 搜索开发者
- 需要用户自行申请并配置 GitHub Personal Access Token
- Token 存储在本地 `.env` 文件中(不会上传到 git)
2. **包含 Prompt 模板**
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **需要外部 API 凭证(GitHub Token)**
- 本 skill 使用 GitHub API 搜索开发者
- 需要用户自行申请并配置 GitHub Personal Access Token
- Token 存储在本地 `.env` 文件中(不会上传到 git)
2. **包含 Prompt 模板**
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **需要外部 API 凭证(GitHub Token)**
- 本 skill 使用 GitHub API 搜索开发者
- 需要用户自行申请并配置 GitHub Personal Access Token
- Token 存储在本地 `.env` 文件中(不会上传到 git)
2. **包含 Prompt 模板**
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. **需要外部 API 凭证(GitHub Token)**
- 本 skill 使用 GitHub API 搜索开发者
- 需要用户自行申请并配置 GitHub Personal Access Token
- Token 存储在本地 `.env` 文件中(不会上传到 git)
2. **包含 Prompt 模板**
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 方式1: 使用 .env 文件(推荐,持久化)
echo "GITHUB_TOKEN=your_token_here" > ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/ai-talent-hunter/.env
# 方式2: 临时环境变量(不持久化)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 方式1: 使用 .env 文件(推荐,持久化)
echo "GITHUB_TOKEN=your_token_here" > ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/ai-talent-hunter/.env
# 方式2: 临时环境变量(不持久化)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 方式1: 使用 .env 文件(推荐,持久化)
echo "GITHUB_TOKEN=your_token_here" > ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/ai-talent-hunter/.env
# 方式2: 临时环境变量(不持久化)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 方式1: 使用 .env 文件(推荐,持久化)
echo "GITHUB_TOKEN=your_token_here" > ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/ai-talent-hunter/.env
# 方式2: 临时环境变量(不持久化)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 方式1: 使用 .env 文件(推荐,持久化)
echo "GITHUB_TOKEN=your_token_here" > ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/ai-talent-hunter/.env
# 方式2: 临时环境变量(不持久化)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 确认 .env 在 .gitignore 中
grep ".env" ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/ai-talent-hunter/.gitignore
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
# Constraints (约束条件)
1. **输出必须是纯 JSON**,不包含任何 Markdown 代码块标记(````json`)
2. **search_queries 必须生成 2-3 个**,从不同维度覆盖(语言、生态、关键词组合)
3. **必须包含活跃度过滤**:`pushed:>2025-01-01`(不要加 stars 限制,冷门技术可能没有高星仓库)
4. **🚨 一条 search_query 中最多只能出现一个 `language:` 标签**。GitHub API 不支持同时搜索多种语言。如果需要搜多种语言,请拆分成多条 query。
This markdown file describes searching GitHub developers, building candidate profiles, ranking contactability, and generating outreach, but its warning section only covers public APIs, no auto-sending, and no private-data scraping. It does not clearly disclose the privacy and outreach implications for users handling personal profile data, which falls under markdown-file user warnings about behaviors affecting privacy.
该文件是 markdown,适用 SQP-1。触发场景中的“帮我找几个…”“想找个…”“给我 5 个候选人”等表述非常接近日常对话,且文档未给出明确的边界或反例来说明哪些招聘相关请求才应触发该 skill,容易与一般性的找人/咨询表达重叠。
SQP-3 适用于所有文件类型。文档明确要求‘不要照搬英文 bio(要翻译/提炼为中文)’,并在多处规定展示内容需翻译为中文,但没有说明这是用户可选项,也没有将该 skill限定为仅面向中文招聘场景,构成语言/locale 强制策略问题。
虽然‘商业语言’本身不是问题,但结合上下文中的中文示例和多处中文翻译要求,这里形成了固定输出风格与语言的约束,却没有提供用户选择或明确说明仅适用于中文招聘场景。根据 SQP-3,这属于缺少语言/locale opt-in 的自然语言政策问题。
The entire instruction set, role, tasking, examples, and required reasoning/output conventions are written to constrain the interaction to Chinese, with no opt-in or alternative language path. Per the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without user choice is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified as region-specific, which is not documented here.
The prompt's 'correct practice' section says to force both pushed:>2025-01-01 and stars:>5, but the formal constraints later explicitly state pushed:>2025-01-01 must be included and stars limits must not be added. This is an active contradiction in the skill's own documentation that can cause downstream behavior to diverge depending on which section the model follows.
The skill is explicitly designed to generate personalized recruiting outreach using a candidate’s background, projects, employer history, and other profile signals, but it provides no guardrails about lawful collection, consent, minimization, or appropriate handling of personal data. This can enable privacy-invasive profiling and targeted unsolicited contact at scale, especially when users are encouraged to reference detailed personal context to increase response rates.
文件标题及全文内容均以中文编写,但没有说明这是面向特定中文地区用户的限定文档,也未向用户提供语言或地区选择。根据规则,未经用户选择而强制单一语言/locale 的自然语言约束属于应报告的组织政策风险。
This Python file contains user-facing natural-language descriptions, docstrings, and CLI messages entirely in Chinese, including the module title and command descriptions. Under the policy for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is in scope, and the file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or that another language can be selected.
The file's docstrings, CLI usage comments, runtime logs, and labels are predominantly in Chinese, with no indication that the user can select another language or that the script is intentionally region-specific. This can violate language/locale policy because it effectively forces one locale for normal operation and troubleshooting.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json"
}
self.endpoint = "https://api.github.com/graphql"
self._last_request_time = 0.0
MAX_RETRIES = 2 # 502/503 重试次数
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
time.sleep(self.REQUEST_INTERVAL - elapsed)
try:
response = requests.post(
self.endpoint,
headers=self.headers,
json=payload,