T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:18- Finding
Unverified and Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 18-26
Vulnerability Type: Unverified third-party dependencies and unpinned package installation
Risk Level: Mediumbash pip install mcp requests # or with uv uv tool install fn-knock-mcp # (if published to PyPI)If installing from source:
bash cd fn_knock_mcp pip install -e .Technical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve
mcp,requests, and potentiallyfn-knock-mcpwithout pinning versions or verifying package hashes. The comment stating “if published to PyPI” indicates that the availability and provenance offn-knock-mcpare not established by the audited project.The project contains only
SKILL.md; it does not include the referenced MCP implementation, package metadata, dependency lockfile, integrity hashes, or source directory. Consequently, the actual behavior of the package installed under thefn-knock-mcpname cannot be compared with the documented behavior.Python packages can execute code during installation or when the MCP server is started. Because the documented server is expected to receive an HMAC administrator secret and communicate with the fn-knock administrative API, compromise or takeover of any installed package could expose a highly privileged authentication credential.
Attack Path
- An attacker publishes, takes over, or compromises one of the referenced registry packages, particularly the unverified
fn-knock-mcppackage name. - A user follows the documented
piporuvinstallation command without a pinned version or integrity verification. - The package executes attacker-controlled code during installation, import, or MCP startup.
- The malicious code reads
FN_KNOCK_HMAC_SECRET, the credentials file, or other files accessible to the current user. - The attacker exfiltrates the secret or directly sends authenticated requests to the local fn-knock administrator API ...[truncated 741 chars]
- An attacker publishes, takes over, or compromises one of the referenced registry packages, particularly the unverified
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete MCP implementation and package metadata in the reviewed project so its behavior can be audited.
- Remove the speculative
fn-knock-mcpregistry installation command until the package name, publisher, and canonical distribution location are verified. - Pin all dependencies to reviewed versions and provide a lockfile with cryptographic hashes.
- Use hash-enforced installation, such as
pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt. - Publish and document the canonical source repository and verified package publisher.
- Install the MCP server in a dedicated virtual environment under a non-privileged service account.
- Perform dependency vulnerability and provenance checks before releases.
- Restrict the runtime account so dependency compromise does not provide access to unrelated user files or credentials.
