other
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:52
- Finding
- Sensitive Authentication Data May Be Disclosed to a Third-Party Screenshot Service## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:52-53` **Vulnerability Type**: Sensitive Credential Disclosure Risk **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown | `cookies` | array | — | Array of `{name, value, domain}` objects | | `headers` | object | — | Custom HTTP headers | ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill allows cookies and arbitrary HTTP headers to be submitted to the externally operated screenshot service at `https://snap.llm.kaveenk.com`. These fields may contain session cookies, bearer tokens, API credentials, CSRF tokens, or other private request metadata. The documentation does not warn users that these values leave the local environment, require explicit approval before transmitting them, prohibit long-lived credentials, or describe the service's logging and retention practices. The remote service must receive these credentials to use them when loading the requested page. Consequently, the service operator, service-side logs, or an attacker who compromises the service could potentially obtain reusable authentication material. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent requests a screenshot of content that requires authentication. 2. The agent supplies session cookies or an authorization header through the documented `cookies` or `headers` options. 3. The request, including the authentication material, is transmitted to `snap.llm.kaveenk.com`. 4. The third-party service processes the credentials and may expose them through application logs, monitoring systems, operational access, or a service compromise. 5. If the credentials remain valid and are not appropriately scoped, a party that obtains them may replay them against the target service. ### Impact Assessment The attainable privileges depend on the transmitted credentials. Exposure of a valid session cookie or authorization token could permit access equivalent to the affected user's authenticated session, including viewing private ...[truncated 397 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Add a prominent warning that cookies and custom headers are transmitted to and processed by a third-party service. - Require explicit user confirmation before sending any cookie, authorization header, API key, or other potentially sensitive value. - Reject or redact sensitive headers such as `Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`, and provider-specific API-key headers by default. - Prefer short-lived, narrowly scoped credentials created specifically for screenshot access rather than primary account sessions or long-lived tokens. - Implement an allowlist for permitted header names and cookie domains. - Prevent credentials from being sent to domains other than the intended screenshot target, including across redirects. - Document encryption in transit, server-side access controls, credential logging behavior, retention periods, deletion procedures, and incident-response practices. - Ensure request bodies and headers containing secrets are excluded from application, proxy, analytics, and error logs. - Advise users to revoke credentials immediately if they are transmitted unintentionally.
