T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:11- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution via Mutable npm Tag
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 11–13
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned executable dependency
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
bash npx clawhub@latest install telegram-discord-bot-devTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command invokes
npxwith the mutable@latesttag. Depending on the local npm environment,npxcan download and execute package-controlled code, including command-line entry points and lifecycle scripts. Because@latestdoes not identify an immutable, previously reviewed release, the code executed by users can change after this Skill has been audited.This creates a supply-chain trust boundary: compromise of the
clawhubpackage, its publisher account, its transitive dependencies, or the package registry could cause the installation command to execute behavior that was not present during review. The project contains no version pin, lockfile, checksum, signature requirement, or other integrity control that constrains the downloaded package.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, dependency chain, or registry distribution path, or otherwise causes a malicious release to become the version selected by the
latesttag. - A user follows the installation command in
SKILL.md. npxresolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release.- Package-controlled command-line or lifecycle code executes with the privileges of the user running
npx. - The malicious release can access resources available to that user, subject to operating-system and environment restrictions.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Potential scope includes reading or modifying user-accessible files, accessing environment variables and locally available credentials, making network requests, and altering project files. If the ...[truncated 338 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, dependency chain, or registry distribution path, or otherwise causes a malicious release to become the version selected by the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith an exact, reviewed package version rather than a mutable distribution tag. - Verify the package publisher, registry source, release provenance, and dependency tree before recommending execution.
- Use lockfiles and registry integrity hashes where applicable so dependency resolution is reproducible.
- Prefer signed releases or provenance attestations and verify them in the installation workflow.
- Review package lifecycle scripts and avoid or disable them when they are not required.
- Run installation in a least-privileged, isolated environment without production credentials or sensitive host mounts.
- Establish a controlled update process in which each new package version is reviewed and tested before the documented pin is changed.
- Replace