Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md `python3 scripts/install_cyberpunk_theme.py --workspace <target-workspace>`
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill openly installs a visual OpenClaw theme and changes live UI files by default, with backups and a skip-apply option, so it is not risk-free but the behavior is coherent with its purpose.
Install only if you want this skill to change the target workspace and the live OpenClaw Control UI. Use --skip-apply first if you want to stage files without modifying the live UI, and review backups before relying on the rollback path. Be aware that a fresh install without bundled/default assets may contact ClawHub to retrieve verified image assets.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
`python3 scripts/install_cyberpunk_theme.py --workspace <target-workspace>`
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
`python3 scripts/install_cyberpunk_theme.py --workspace <target-workspace>`
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
`python3 scripts/install_cyberpunk_theme.py --workspace <target-workspace>`
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
`python3 scripts/install_cyberpunk_theme.py --workspace <target-workspace>`
The skill clearly documents capabilities that read and write workspace files, execute Python scripts, modify a live Control UI, and may download assets from the network, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. That mismatch is dangerous because an agent or user may invoke a skill with broad implicit authority without clear consent, making destructive or unexpected system changes easier.
The documentation states that installation will immediately apply the theme to the live OpenClaw control UI and generate reusable scripts in the target workspace, but it does not present a prominent warning about modifying a live environment. This is risky because users may run the command expecting a local theme install and instead alter production-like UI state, requiring rollback or causing disruption.
The display name and short description are presented in Chinese, while the file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or that users can choose their preferred language. This creates a locale-policy concern because the skill appears to impose a specific language without opt-in or justification.
The default prompt advertises a broad invocation phrase that can trigger installation, repair, import, and asset-swapping behaviors without clearly constraining when or how the skill should be used. In an agent ecosystem, underspecified triggers increase the chance of accidental invocation, prompt-routing confusion, or user manipulation into applying theme changes in the wrong workspace or context.
The quota label normalization converts English labels like 'week'/'weekly' into the Chinese label '周' unconditionally. This is a natural-language locale choice embedded in code and does not offer a user language preference or document a justified region-specific constraint.
The selector :root, :root[data-theme-mode="light"] assigns identical dark-theme variables and sets color-scheme:dark, overriding the declared light mode. This is a natural-language policy concern because the file comments and selectors indicate intentional theme enforcement without user opt-in or an explicit documented exception.
The file's instructional content is presented only in Chinese, which can amount to forcing a specific language without user opt-in under the stated policy. There is no indication that this skill is region-specific or that users may choose another language.
The installer can fetch a remote ZIP bundle from clawhub.ai to restore missing theme assets, which expands the trust boundary beyond the locally bundled theme described by the skill. Although the code enforces a size limit and verifies SHA-256 hashes on decoded assets, this still introduces network dependency, external content retrieval, and a remotely triggered install path that could fail open operational expectations or increase attack surface if the download source, transport, or bundle composition is compromised.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
return candidate
try:
npm_root = subprocess.run(
['npm', 'root', '-g'],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
The natural-language instructions and operational guidance in this skill are predominantly Chinese, and the file does not indicate that the user can choose another language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking audience. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.
The aria-label text is fixed in Chinese ("赛博朋克主题封面"), which imposes a specific language in user-facing content. Because this file provides no opt-in, alternate locale, or justification that it is intended only for a Chinese-language context, it appears to violate the language/locale policy criterion.
The primary user-visible text includes Chinese strings such as "赛博朋克主题" and "可替换主助手 / Tool / 用户头像,以及聊天与梦境背景。" This fixes the asset to a specific language without indicating that users can choose another locale or that the asset is intentionally region-specific.
The image metadata uses a Chinese-only aria-label ("赛博朋克主题图标"), which imposes a specific language choice in user-facing text. This is a natural-language locale choice without any indication of user preference or documented regional scope.
This markdown file gives users commands and manual steps to install or replace theme assets in a workspace, including rerunning an install script and hand-replacing target files. Although the behavior is expected for a theme-install skill, the document does not explicitly warn that existing files in those paths may be overwritten or modified.
Beyond installing and swapping theme assets, the script reads IDENTITY.md and SOUL.md from the workspace and derives a nameplate string that is later injected into the live UI CSS. That behavior goes beyond the manifest’s stated scope of theme installation, compatibility repair, workspace import, and avatar/background swapping.
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.
'dream_avatar',
'dream_background',
):
if getattr(args, attr) is not None:
continue
value = config_value(config, *CONFIG_KEY_ALIASES[attr])
if isinstance(value, str) and value.strip():