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Security audit

Credential Vault

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This credential-vault skill is coherent, but it asks users to install mutable global code that handles secrets and OpenClaw hooks, while documenting unsafe plaintext credential entry.

Review the exact npm package version and source before installing, avoid entering real secrets via --key command arguments, and only use this if you are comfortable granting a plugin access to credential storage plus OpenClaw execution and message/transcript hooks.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Security-Sensitive npm Package

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding

Plaintext Credentials Supplied Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
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--key ` — Add a credential (interactive usage selection: API, CLI) - `vault rotate --key ` — Rotate a credential (re-encrypts in place) ``` ```bash # API header injection openclaw vault add stripe --key "sk_live_..." --use api --url "api.stripe.com/*" --yes # CLI env injection openclaw vault add github --key "ghp_..." --use cli --command gh --env GITHUB_TOKEN --yes ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented interface places credentials directly in the command's argument vector through `--key`. Quoting the value prevents ordinary shell word splitting but does not make the secret confidential. Depending on the operating system and local configuration, command-line arguments may be visible through process-inspection interfaces while the command is running. The command can also be retained in interactive shell history, terminal capture, audit systems, debugging output, command telemetry, or synchronized history services. This behavior contradicts the Skill's objective of keeping credentials outside observable Agent and system contexts. Encryption performed after the command starts does not remediate plaintext copies already exposed through command entry and process creation. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented command and places a real API key, token, or password after `--key`. 2. The shell records the complete command in history, or the operating system exposes the argument vector while the process runs. 3. A local ...[truncated 1052 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

md
## Commands

- `vault init` — Initialize vault and create `~/.openclaw/vault/` directory
- `vault add <tool> --key <cred>` — Add a credential (interactive usage selection: API, CLI)
- `vault list` — Show all stored credentials and status
- `vault show <tool>` — Show credential details and injection config