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Security audit

OpenClaw Power Ops

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a legitimate OpenClaw administration reference, but it needs review because it gives broad high-impact operations, destructive fixes, and token-handling examples without enough scoping or warnings.

Review this skill before installing it in environments where OpenClaw controls real channels, agents, credentials, or gateway access. Treat its commands as operator references, not automatic actions: confirm destructive commands, avoid putting tokens directly in shell commands, back up configuration before --fix operations, and adapt or remove the hard-coded personal environment notes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/cli-cheatsheet.md:17
Finding

Telegram Bot Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
``` ### Technical Analysis The documented command instructs users to provide a Telegram bot token directly as a command-line argument. When the placeholder is replaced with an actual token, the secret can be exposed through: - Shell history files if the command is entered interactively. - Process inspection utilities while the command is running. - Operating-system auditing and endpoint-monitoring logs. - Terminal session recording or command telemetry. - Diagnostic output that captures the invoked command. Command-line arguments are not an appropriate secret-transfer mechanism because they may be observable by systems and principals other than the intended process. ### Attack Path 1. An administrator follows the documented procedure and replaces `` with a valid Telegram bot token. 2. The command containing the token is recorded in shell history, terminal telemetry, audit logs, or process information. 3. A local user, support operator, monitoring service, or attacker with access to those records retrieves the token. 4. The attacker uses the token against the Telegram Bot API. 5. The attacker can impersonate or operate the affected bot within the permissions and functionality granted to that bot. ### Impact Assessment Exposure grants control associated with the compromised Telegram bot token. Depending on the bot configuration, an attacker may send messages as the bot, inspect available bot updates, disrupt legitimate operation, or interact with OpenClaw workflows connected to the bot. The impact is limited to the affected bot and any downstream systems that trust its messages, but those downstream integrations may expand the practical scope. ]]>
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/security-audit.md:36
Finding

Gateway Authentication Token Exposed in Process Arguments and Plaintext Configuration

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (12)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill description includes broad trigger phrases such as 'any OpenClaw administrative task,' 'set up OpenClaw,' and 'fix the gateway,' which can cause the skill to activate for high-impact operational requests without enough narrowing or confirmation. In an administrative skill that can influence configuration, channels, models, and security posture, overbroad routing increases the chance of unsafe or unintended privileged actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends auto-remediation commands such as 'openclaw doctor --fix' and 'openclaw security audit --deep --fix' without warning that they may modify system configuration or change runtime state. In an ops-focused skill, presenting self-modifying commands as routine diagnostics can lead to unintended changes, service disruption, or security regressions if an agent or operator runs them automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes openclaw channels remove --channel telegram --delete, which appears to remove a channel and explicitly delete associated configuration, but the surrounding text provides no warning about the action's destructive effect. For markdown files, safety-impacting behaviors that could affect system configuration or user data should be accompanied by a clear warning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The cheat sheet documents openclaw agents delete <agent-id> with no surrounding caution about deleting an agent. In markdown guidance, destructive operations that can affect system state or user-managed configuration should include a visible warning so users understand the impact before executing them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The cheat sheet includes token-handling commands such as setup-token and paste-token without any guidance on protecting credentials from shell history, terminal logging, screen sharing, or audit logs. In an ops context, this increases the likelihood of credential exposure, which could enable unauthorized access to model providers and downstream service abuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-audit.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
### High

4. **Control UI wildcard origins** (`allowedOrigins: ["*"]`) — CSRF risk. Restrict to localhost.
5. **World-readable credentials** — WhatsApp session files at 644. Fix: `chmod 600`.
6. **Unencrypted node communication** — Set `tls: true` in `node.json`.

### Medium

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-audit.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

md
### High

4. **Control UI wildcard origins** (`allowedOrigins: ["*"]`) — CSRF risk. Restrict to localhost.
5. **World-readable credentials** — WhatsApp session files at 644. Fix: `chmod 600`.
6. **Unencrypted node communication** — Set `tls: true` in `node.json`.

### Medium

Unsafe Defaults

Medium
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is a real vulnerability being documented: world-readable credential/session files expose secrets to any local user or process with filesystem access. In an administrative OpenClaw context, such files may contain bot tokens or session material that can enable account takeover, impersonation, or lateral movement.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-audit.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
### High

4. **Control UI wildcard origins** (`allowedOrigins: ["*"]`) — CSRF risk. Restrict to localhost.
5. **World-readable credentials** — WhatsApp session files at 644. Fix: `chmod 600`.
6. **Unencrypted node communication** — Set `tls: true` in `node.json`.

### Medium

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-audit.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
### Medium

7. **Permissive directory modes** — `credentials/`, `identity/`, `logs/`, `browser/`, `skills/` at 755. Fix: `chmod 700`.
8. **Unrestricted subagent access** — `allowAgents: ["*"]` lets any agent spawn as any other. Scope to specific lists.
9. **Group bots not requiring @mention** — Responds to every message, wasting tokens.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-audit.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

md
### Medium

7. **Permissive directory modes** — `credentials/`, `identity/`, `logs/`, `browser/`, `skills/` at 755. Fix: `chmod 700`.
8. **Unrestricted subagent access** — `allowAgents: ["*"]` lets any agent spawn as any other. Scope to specific lists.
9. **Group bots not requiring @mention** — Responds to every message, wasting tokens.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The example openclaw config unset tools.web.search.apiKey modifies a sensitive credential-related setting, but the cheat sheet provides no warning that it changes authentication behavior and may break dependent features. Even though this is an example, markdown that instructs users to alter sensitive config should disclose the operational impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The gateway section lists openclaw gateway stop and openclaw gateway restart without mentioning that these commands interrupt service availability. In markdown skill documentation, operationally disruptive actions that affect system integrity or availability should include a brief warning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.