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Security audit

File Browser Operator

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This FileBrowser skill is transparent documentation, but it gives an agent broad file, sharing, deletion, and admin-capable API authority with some scope and confirmation gaps.

Install only if you intend an agent to operate your FileBrowser account. Use a least-privilege FileBrowser user, set a narrow scope, avoid admin credentials unless account management is intentional, review exact file lists before organizing or deleting, and prefer short-lived share links that you revoke after use.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The example commands at the end of the skill operate on root-level paths such as `path=/`, `hello.txt`, and `/api/raw/hello.txt`, which directly contradict the earlier requirement that all operations must remain under a configured `scope`. In practice, users or agents often copy examples verbatim, so this inconsistency can cause out-of-scope reads and writes despite the documented restriction.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The reference expands the skill’s usable surface beyond the stated file-browsing and scoped organization workflow by documenting global settings and full user-management endpoints. Even if presented as reference material, this can enable an agent or integrator to invoke admin-capable actions unrelated to the declared purpose, increasing the risk of account takeover, privilege changes, or broad instance modification.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The document claims all paths must remain within configured scope, but it also documents endpoints such as user management, sharing, and settings that are not path-scoped at all. This mismatch is dangerous because it creates a false sense of containment while still exposing instructions for global administrative actions that can affect the entire FileBrowser instance.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.install_untrusted_source

Install source points to URL shortener or raw IP.

Warn
Code
suspicious.install_untrusted_source
Location
config.example.json:2