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Security audit

Tpt Generate Cover

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward browser-assisted cover generator with a real filename-safety caveat, but no evidence of hidden persistence, exfiltration, destructive behavior, or purpose-mismatched authority.

Install only if you trust the local TXT inputs and the `geminibuild` browser profile. Before running, sanitize story titles into safe basenames, reject path separators or reserved Windows names, and avoid overwriting existing output files in `E:\AI\openclaw-tpt\output\COVER\`. Be aware the skill uses an already logged-in Google session, although it instructs the agent not to handle login or account changes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.MD:40
Finding

Unsanitized Story Title Used as an Output Filename

Content
View full analysis
.png ``` The unsafe data flow is repeated in the procedure at lines 72–89: ```markdown 5. Read latest TXT file from: E:\AI\openclaw-tpt\input\TXT\ - Extract TITLE (first line) - Extract STORY CONTEXT (remaining content) 6. Fill the TITLE field in the tool. 7. Fill STORY CONTEXT field. 8. Click "Generate Cover". 9. Wait for generated image preview to appear. 10. Download generated image. 11. Save image to: E:\AI\openclaw-tpt\output\COVER\ Filename: .png ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill treats the first line of the latest TXT file as an untrusted `TITLE` and directly reuses it as the downloaded image's filename. No instruction requires validation, basename extraction, canonicalization, length limits, reserved-name checks, or destination containment verification. On Windows, a crafted title may contain path separators, traversal components such as `..\`, drive or UNC path syntax, control characters, trailing dots or spaces, or reserved device names. Depending on how the browser automation implements the save operation, these values may cause the generated file to be written outside the intended `output\COVER` directory, overwrite an existing PNG, or make the workflow fail. Browser-level filename normalization may limit exploitation in some implementations, but the skill itself does not establish or verify that protection. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker or untrusted ...[truncated 1348 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep