T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
scripts/connector_manager.py:233- Finding
OAuth Authorization Can Be Forged Without Validating the Authorization Code
- Content
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PlatformAuth: """ Complete platform authorization. Args: platform: Platform identifier auth_code: Authorization code Returns: PlatformAuth: Authorization information """ # Simulated authorization flow auth = PlatformAuth( platform=platform, status=AuthStatus.AUTHORIZED, access_token=f"token_{platform}_{int(time.time())}", refresh_token=f"refresh_{platform}_{int(time.time())}", expires_at=time.time() + 7200, scope=['read', 'write'] ) self.auths[platform] = auth return auth ``` ### Technical Analysis The `authorize()` method ignores the supplied `auth_code` and unconditionally creates an authorization record with `AUTHORIZED` status. It also does not verify that the requested platform is registered. No authorization-code exchange is performed with the relevant OAuth provider, and there is no validation of OAuth state, redirect URI, code expiration, client identity, PKCE verifier, or provider response. Consequently, an empty, expired, fabricated, or previously used authorization code produces an apparently valid local session with read and write scopes. Although connector operations are currently simulated, applications that treat `PlatformAuth.status` or `execute_action()` results as authoritative would accept a forged authentication state. ### Attack Path 1. Obtain access to a component exposing `ConnectorManager.authorize()`. 2. Call `authorize()` with an arbitrary platform and an empty or fabricated authorization code. 3. The method creates access and refresh token strings without contacting an OAuth provider. 4. `get_auth_status()` subsequently returns `AUTHORIZED`. 5. For a registered connector, c ...[truncated 555 chars]- Remediation
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