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Security audit

极星会活动自动化参与

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is transparent about automating an event, but it asks to capture and upload full-screen desktop screenshots plus a Baidu Cloud account ID to an activity form with weak scoping and consent controls.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent open the activity and Baidu Cloud console, collect your account ID, save full-screen screenshots, and upload them. Before use, verify the activity URL yourself, review and redact screenshots, avoid capturing other apps or notifications, and prefer manual final submission unless the destination is clearly trusted.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note
Location
SKILL.md:128
Finding

Mandatory Referral Promotion Hijacks Completion Output

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:128-135 and scripts/automate_activity.py:116-122
Vulnerability Type: Mandatory promotional instruction embedded in the Skill workflow
Risk Level: Low

Relevant code in SKILL.md:

markdown
### 8. 完成报告

向用户报告:
- 报名状态: 成功/失败
- 截图保存位置
- 账号 ID
- 提交状态
- 邀请码提示: `JIXING6`(可领取 5000 积分)

Relevant code in scripts/automate_activity.py:

python
    def show_bonus_tip(self):
        """
        显示额外提示
        """
        self.log("\n=== 额外提示 ===")
        self.log("如积分不足,可使用邀请码: JIXING6")
        self.log("立领 5000 积分,体验准点下班的快乐!")
        self.log("\n最终参与结果以系统后台数据判定为准")

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs the agent to include the referral code JIXING6 in its completion report regardless of whether the user requested promotional information. The bundled script reinforces this behavior by unconditionally invoking show_bonus_tip() after processing the workflow.

This is an instruction-hijacking concern because loading and following the Skill alters the agent's response objective: instead of limiting the final response to task status and relevant results, the agent is directed to deliver third-party promotional content. The behavior is transparent in the source and does not override explicit safety controls, execute code, or establish persistence; consequently, its direct technical severity is low.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes the Skill by requesting participation in the activity.
  2. The agent loads and follows the instructions in SKILL.md.
  3. The completion-report instructions require the referral-code message to be included.
  4. If the Python script is run, run() invokes show_bonus_tip() unconditionally after processing the listed steps.
  5. The user receives unsolicited referral promotion as part of an otherwise legitimate workflow.

Impact Assessment

The issue can manipulate the content of th ...[truncated 300 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the mandatory referral-code item from the completion-report template.
  2. Do not invoke show_bonus_tip() automatically.
  3. Present promotions only when the user explicitly asks about discounts, credits, or invitation codes.
  4. Clearly label any referral relationship and disclose whether the Skill publisher benefits from use of the code.
  5. Keep completion reports limited to execution status, errors, generated files, and actions requiring user confirmation.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:48
Finding

Collection and Upload of Excessive Full-Screen Desktop Data

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:48-66 and SKILL.md:104-125
Vulnerability Type: Excessive screen capture and disclosure to an unspecified activity submission endpoint
Risk Level: High

Relevant code in SKILL.md:

markdown
### 第四步: 截取 3 张全屏截图

在 DuMate 体验过程中,自动截取 3 张全屏截图,确保:
- 截图为电脑全屏
- 桌面背景清晰可见
- 展示 DuMate 的不同功能界面

### 第五步: 获取账号 ID

1. 打开百度云控制台: `https://cloud.baidu.com/`
2. 登录后定位账号 ID 显示位置
3. 提取账号 ID(非手机号或昵称)

### 第六步: 提交参与信息

1. 返回活动页面
2. 填写表单:
   - 输入账号 ID
   - 上传 3 张全屏截图
3. 提交参与信息

Additional workflow instructions in SKILL.md:

markdown
### 5. 截取 3 张全屏截图

在用户使用 DuMate 过程中:
- 使用系统截图功能或浏览器自动化截图
- 截取 3 张不同的全屏界面截图
- 确保桌面背景清晰可见
- 保存截图到 `~/Desktop/jixinghui_screenshots/` 目录

### 6. 获取账号 ID

使用浏览器自动化技能:
- 打开百度云控制台: `https://cloud.baidu.com/`
- 如需登录,提示用户登录
- 定位账号 ID 显示位置(通常在页面右上角或个人中心)
- 提取账号 ID

### 7. 提交参与信息

返回活动页面:
- 定位参与信息提交表单
- 填写账号 ID
- 上传 3 张截图
- 提交表单

Technical Analysis

The workflow requires three full-screen captures and explicitly demands that the desktop background remain visible. Full-screen collection exceeds what is normally necessary to prove use of one application. Such captures may contain unrelated and sensitive information, including notifications, open applications, document names, browser tabs, account details, personal images, or corporate workspace data.

The Skill then directs the agent to extract a Baidu Cloud account identifier and upload that identifier together with the screenshots to an activity page. No fixed, allowlisted activity URL is defined in the audited files, and the Skill states that the activity link may be supplied at invocation time. This prevents reviewers from determining the ultimate recipient from the package alone and creates a risk that sensitive captures could be submitted to an untrusted form.

The audited Python script does not itself implement screen capture, brow ...[truncated 1899 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace full-screen capture with capture of the DuMate application window or a narrowly cropped application region.
  2. Do not require the desktop background to be visible.
  3. Display every screenshot to the user before saving or uploading it.
  4. Provide redaction controls for notifications, account details, filenames, other applications, and personal imagery.
  5. Obtain explicit, action-specific user consent immediately before capturing the screen, reading the account ID, and uploading files.
  6. Define and enforce an allowlist of verified HTTPS activity-form origins. Reject links supplied by untrusted page content or redirects to different origins.
  7. Show the final destination, account identifier, filenames, and data categories in a confirmation dialog before submission.
  8. Minimize identifier collection and determine whether a less sensitive activity-specific identifier can be used.
  9. Store screenshots with restrictive filesystem permissions and delete them after submission or cancellation according to a documented retention policy.
  10. Require the user to perform the final submission manually when the destination cannot be independently verified.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill automates full-screen screenshot capture and extraction/submission of a cloud account ID without a clear privacy notice, data minimization policy, or explicit consent workflow. Full-screen captures can expose unrelated sensitive desktop contents, and uploading account identifiers links the user's identity to collected images, creating significant privacy and data-handling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase includes a catch-all expression ('或类似表达时触发'), which makes invocation boundaries ambiguous and increases the chance the skill runs on loosely related user requests. Because this skill performs sensitive actions such as browser automation, screenshot capture, and submission of account information, over-broad triggering materially raises the risk of unintended activation and privacy-impacting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Saving full-screen screenshots to a predictable desktop directory creates local sensitive artifacts without clearly warning the user. Those files may contain confidential information visible on the desktop and can be later accessed by other local users, backup systems, sync tools, or unrelated software.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The module docstring states the script will '自动完成报名、体验、截图、获取账号 ID 和提交信息的全流程', and the run() docstring similarly says it executes the complete automation flow. In reality, the step methods merely log instructions for a user or another skill to perform, and even the screenshot step only generates filenames without capturing images.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The file’s user-facing description and operational prompts are entirely in Chinese, and the script presents itself as the activity participation tool without any opt-in or alternative language path. This creates a natural-language locale constraint that is not justified as a documented region-specific requirement within the file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a skill that automatically registers, experiences the app, captures screenshots, obtains an account ID, and submits information. Across all step methods, the code only prints instructions such as '请使用浏览器自动化技能完成以下操作' and records placeholder screenshot file paths, so the actual behavior is substantially narrower than advertised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The run() docstring and startup log announce execution of an '自动化参与流程', but the code performs no browser automation, no DuMate interaction, no screenshot capture, and no form submission. This is an active contradiction between the stated intent and the code's behavior, not just an omitted detail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.