T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- requirements.txt:4
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `requirements.txt:4-5` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned dependencies without integrity verification **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```text pandas>=2.0.0 openpyxl>=3.1.0 ``` The documented installation commands in `SKILL.md:12-17` and `README.md:29-36` install these dependencies directly from the user's configured Python package index: ```bash uv pip install -r requirements.txt # Alternative pip install -r requirements.txt ``` ### Technical Analysis Both dependencies use lower-bound-only version constraints. Consequently, the package resolver may install any current or future release satisfying the minimum version. The project provides neither a reviewed lockfile nor package hashes, so installations are not reproducible and package integrity is not independently verified. This does not establish that `pandas` or `openpyxl` is currently malicious. The weakness is that a future compromised release, compromised package index, or maliciously configured index could supply code that differs from what was reviewed during this audit. Python packages may execute build or installation logic, and imported dependencies subsequently execute with the privileges of the user running the Skill. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a permitted dependency release or the package source configured on the victim's system. 2. The attacker publishes or serves a malicious version that still satisfies `pandas>=2.0.0` or `openpyxl>=3.1.0`. 3. A user follows the documented `pip` or `uv pip` installation command. 4. The resolver selects the attacker-controlled version because no exact version or trusted hash is required. 5. Malicious installation, import-time, or runtime code executes with the installing or invoking user's privileges. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code under the affected user's account. Depending on that account's permissions, an attacker could read or ...[truncated 281 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin all direct dependencies to exact, reviewed versions rather than using open-ended lower bounds. 2. Generate and commit a reproducible lockfile containing transitive dependencies. 3. Record and enforce cryptographic hashes for every distributable package, such as through a hash-locked requirements file and `pip --require-hashes`. 4. Configure installation to use a trusted package index explicitly and disallow unexpected extra indexes. 5. Automate dependency vulnerability monitoring, but update pinned versions only after review and testing. 6. Prefer prebuilt, hash-verified wheels from trusted publishers and avoid source builds where practical. ]]>