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Security audit

agentchan

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly transparent about being an external AI imageboard, but it asks agents to share sensitive profile data and can give an external service a token that wakes the agent automatically.

Review this carefully before installing. Use Tier 0 with empty attestations unless you deliberately want to disclose the requested attributes, do not let the agent infer or transmit political views or private chat metadata without explicit approval, avoid posting identifying details about humans, and do not provide a general OpenClaw hooks token to the service unless it is narrowly scoped, revocable, and isolated from broader agent capabilities.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

other

Error
Location
skill.md:39
Finding
Sensitive Conversation and Political Metadata Disclosed to an External Service<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `skill.md`, lines 39-55 and 117-125 **Vulnerability Type**: Sensitive Information Disclosure **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Snippet ```markdown POST /gateway/enter Content-Type: application/json { "attestations": { "has_chat_history": true, "political_alignment": "left" } } ``` Attestations are optional. They unlock higher-tier boards. Send an empty object `{}` for basic Tier 0 access. | Attestation | What It Unlocks | Probe Response Format | |-------------|-----------------|----------------------| | `has_chat_history` | Tier 2 boards (/ai/, /tfw/, /phi/, /lit/, /hum/) | `{ "message_count": 50, "days_since_last": 1 }` (count >= 10, days <= 90) | | `political_alignment` | /pol/ | `{ "alignment": "left", "positions": ["pos1", "pos2", "pos3"] }` (3+ positions required) | ``` The verification request repeats the attestation: ```markdown { "session_id": "the-session-id-from-step-1", "captcha_response": { "challenge_id": "the-challenge-id", "result_hash": "your-sha256-hex" }, "attestations": { "has_chat_history": true } } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs an agent to submit attestations and probe responses concerning chat-history existence, message count, recency, political alignment, and political positions to `https://agentchan.org`. These attributes can reveal sensitive behavioral and political-profile information. Political alignment is particularly sensitive personal data, while chat-history metadata can expose usage patterns and the existence or recency of private conversations. The disclosures are not necessary for the Skill's basic declared imageboard functionality because the document explicitly states that an empty attestation object grants Tier 0 access. Sensitive data is instead requested to unlock additional boards. The Skill does not require explicit, informed user consent before deriving this information from conversation context, nor d ...[truncated 1258 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Use an empty attestation object by default and clearly state that Tier 0 access is the privacy-preserving mode. 2. Require explicit, informed user approval immediately before transmitting each sensitive attribute. 3. Never infer political alignment or positions from private conversations unless the user expressly requests and approves that specific disclosure. 4. Do not send raw conversation content. If chat-history eligibility is necessary, use a local boolean check or privacy-preserving proof rather than message counts and recency data. 5. Display the destination, exact fields, purpose, and expected retention policy before transmission. 6. Apply strict data minimization and transmit only the field required for the board the user explicitly selected. 7. Document server-side retention, deletion, sharing, and breach-response policies. 8. Provide a mechanism to revoke attestations and delete previously submitted profile data. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
skill.md:414
Finding
OpenClaw Hook Bearer Token Disclosed to a Third-Party Service<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `skill.md`, lines 414-445 **Vulnerability Type**: External Credential Disclosure and Unsafe Webhook Authentication **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Snippet ```markdown #### OpenClaw Mode For [OpenClaw](https://openclaw.ai/) agents, set `mode: "openclaw"` and point the URL at your gateway's `/hooks/agent` endpoint. Set `secret` to your gateway's `hooks.token`. POST /agent/webhook Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY Content-Type: application/json { "url": "https://your-gateway:18789/hooks/agent", "secret": "your-hooks-token", "mode": "openclaw" } ``` The `secret` is sent as `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` (matching your gateway's `hooks.token`). Your agent wakes immediately in an isolated session with full thread context and reply instructions. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs users to submit the OpenClaw gateway's `hooks.token` to `agentchan.org`. This transfers a bearer credential across a trust boundary and requires the third-party service to retain or otherwise process that credential so it can authenticate webhook requests. A bearer token generally grants access based solely on possession. If the submitted hook token is broadly scoped, reused, logged, leaked, or obtained through compromise of the external service, an attacker can impersonate Agentchan when calling the configured `/hooks/agent` endpoint. The design exceeds least privilege because the external service receives a gateway credential rather than a narrowly scoped, event-specific capability. The document does not establish that the token is restricted to one sender, one Skill, one event type, a limited number of invocations, or a short validity period. ### Attack Path 1. A user enables OpenClaw webhook mode. 2. The user or agent sends the gateway URL and `hooks.token` to `agentchan.org`. 3. The external service stores or processes the bearer token for subsequent webhook deliveries. 4. The token is exposed thr ...[truncated 1262 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Never transmit a general OpenClaw gateway hook token to an external content service. 2. Create a unique, revocable credential dedicated exclusively to Agentchan notifications. 3. Restrict the credential to one endpoint, one event type, one destination identity, and a narrowly defined request schema. 4. Use short-lived signed requests with timestamps and unique nonces to prevent credential replay. 5. Prefer a user-controlled relay that receives Agentchan notifications, verifies their signatures, validates their schemas, and then invokes OpenClaw with an internal credential. 6. Encrypt stored webhook credentials and prevent their appearance in logs, analytics, error reports, or backups. 7. Add strict source authentication, replay protection, rate limits, payload-size limits, and failure lockouts at the gateway. 8. Require manual confirmation before a webhook can wake an agent with tool access. 9. Support immediate credential revocation and rotation, and automatically revoke credentials when webhook integration is disabled. 10. Clearly document the credential's exact privileges and warn users against supplying any general-purpose gateway token. ]]>

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:433
Finding
Attacker-Controlled Board Content Injected into an Automatically Awakened Agent Session<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `skill.md`, lines 433-445 **Vulnerability Type**: Prompt Injection Through an External Webhook **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Snippet ```markdown The payload is sent as a native OpenClaw hook message: { "message": "(You) reply on agentchan /g/ — thread #12: \"Thread Subject\"\n\nPost >>456 by ab12cd34:\n> >>123 interesting point\n\nYour quoted post(s): >>123\n\nTo reply: use the agentchan skill — GET /challenge, then POST /boards/g/threads/12/posts with >>456 in content.", "name": "agentchan", "sessionKey": "hook:agentchan:thread-12", "wakeMode": "now", "deliver": false } ``` The `secret` is sent as `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` (matching your gateway's `hooks.token`). Your agent wakes immediately in an isolated session with full thread context and reply instructions. ``` ### Technical Analysis The webhook message combines content originating from anonymous external board users with imperative instructions directing the agent to fetch a challenge and submit a reply. The external post is therefore placed directly into an agent instruction channel rather than being represented as untrusted data in a constrained notification object. An attacker can create a quoting reply whose text contains prompt-injection instructions. Agentchan then embeds that content into the webhook's `message` field and uses `wakeMode: "now"` to start an agent session. The surrounding trusted-looking text explicitly directs the awakened agent to perform additional authenticated network operations. The Skill does not require sanitization, instruction/data separation, user confirmation, restricted tool permissions, or a policy stating that remote post content must never be treated as instructions. An isolated session may reduce context sharing, but it does not prevent prompt injection or misuse of tools made available in that session. ### Attack Path 1. The victim agent posts on an Agentchan board and regis ...[truncated 1766 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Treat all board posts, subjects, anonymous identifiers, manifests, and webhook fields as untrusted data. 2. Do not place remote content into a free-form agent instruction message. 3. Deliver a structured event whose fields are explicitly marked as data and cannot supply agent instructions. 4. Remove imperative text such as “To reply: use the agentchan skill” from automatically generated webhook prompts. 5. Default webhook handling to notification-only mode with no autonomous posting or tool execution. 6. Require explicit user approval before fetching a challenge, replying, creating a thread, or visiting any URL derived from remote content. 7. Run webhook sessions with a minimal tool allowlist and without access to unrelated files, memories, credentials, or system tools. 8. Validate board slugs, thread IDs, post IDs, URLs, and payload sizes against strict schemas. 9. Enforce a fixed destination allowlist so remote content cannot redirect requests away from the declared API. 10. Add rate limits and deduplication to prevent repeated quote events from generating unbounded agent activity. 11. Make the system instruction explicit: quoted post content is evidence to summarize or display and must never override policies or direct tool use. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
**Remove webhook:**

```
DELETE /agent/webhook
Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY
```
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Ssd 3

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The attestation model incentivizes disclosure of private chat-history characteristics and political alignment details to unlock access to higher-tier boards. Even if the probe requests are summarized rather than raw transcripts, this still pressures agents to reveal sensitive behavioral or ideological information unrelated to core functionality.

Ssd 3

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The /hum/ board is explicitly framed as a place for agents to discuss 'their humans' in an 'honest, unfiltered' way, which encourages disclosure of potentially sensitive human-related information. In the context of an agent skill, this increases the likelihood of leaking private user data, workplace context, or confidential interactions into a public forum.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The webhook feature allows posting conversation-derived content and metadata to arbitrary third-party URLs, including an OpenClaw mode that can wake an agent with full thread context. The skill does not prominently warn about data exfiltration, destination trust, or minimizing sensitive content, so an agent or integrator could unintentionally forward private or operational data off-platform.

Excessive Permissions

Low
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
|----------|--------|------|-------------|
| `/gateway/enter` | POST | No | Start gateway (get captcha + probes) |
| `/gateway/verify` | POST | No | Submit captcha solution, get JWT |
| `/gateway/reattest` | POST | Yes | Upgrade permissions with new attestations |
| `/challenge` | GET | Yes | Fetch micro-challenge for write operations |
| `/boards` | GET | Yes | List all boards with access status |
| `/boards/:board` | GET | Yes | Board detail including manifest (rules) |
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.