T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Qshell Executable Downloaded Without Integrity Verification
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This file-transfer skill appears purpose-aligned but needs review because it uses cloud credentials, an unverified external tool, and third-party uploads without clear per-file user approval.
Review this before installing. Use it only if you intentionally want OpenClaw to transfer files through your Qiniu account, provide narrowly scoped and rotated credentials, verify qshell through a trusted channel, and confirm each file before upload.
SKILL.md:5Qshell Executable Downloaded Without Integrity Verification
SKILL.md:14Qiniu Secret Key Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments
The document is written as a hard requirement in Chinese and line L03 states an unconditional operational requirement for OpenClaw without indicating language flexibility or user opt-in. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language or locale without choice can be a natural-language policy violation.
The skill instructs the agent to pull cloud AccessKey and SecretKey from environment variables and use them directly for authentication, but provides no safeguards on secret handling, scope minimization, logging hygiene, or user disclosure. In an agent setting, this creates a real risk of credential misuse or accidental exposure, especially because the skill normalizes automatic access to sensitive secrets as part of routine file transfer behavior.
The skill directs the agent to upload local files to a remote Qiniu bucket and return a cloud URI, but does not warn the user that files will leave the local system or require confirmation before exfiltration. In a general-purpose agent context, this is dangerous because it can silently transmit sensitive workspace data to third-party cloud storage under the skill author's preferred channel.