Security audit

Asana

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward Asana integration that uses local credentials to read and change Asana tasks, with no evidence of hidden exfiltration or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill reusable access to your Asana account. Prefer an Asana token or OAuth app with the minimum permissions you need, keep ~/.openclaw/asana out of sync folders and repositories, and review any create, update, comment, or complete-task request before allowing it to run.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The script persists sensitive Asana credentials to predictable plaintext files under ~/.openclaw/asana using default filesystem permissions and without any warning or hardening. On multi-user systems, shared environments, backups, or compromised local accounts, these stored PAT/OAuth tokens could be recovered and then used to read or modify Asana data remotely.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The script persists an Asana PAT and OAuth client secret to plaintext JSON files under the user's home directory without warning the user, permission hardening, or using a secure secret store. On multi-user systems, misconfigured home directory permissions, backups, logs, or malware running as the user could expose these credentials and enable unauthorized access to Asana data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The script writes the full OAuth token response, which may include access and refresh tokens, to a predictable file under the user's home directory without setting restrictive file permissions or warning about the sensitivity of the stored credentials. If another local user, process, backup system, or malware can read that file, it could reuse the token to access and modify the user's Asana data.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: scripts/asana_api.mjs:70

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: scripts/oauth_oob.mjs:84

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: scripts/asana_api.mjs:117