T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
README.md:221- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:221
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash # Install Ollama curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh # Run local model ollama run qwen2.5:14bTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions download a mutable script from an external URL and immediately pipe its contents into
sh. The downloaded payload is neither version-pinned nor authenticated through a separately verified signature or checksum. Users are also given no opportunity to inspect the retrieved script before execution.HTTPS protects data in transit under normal conditions, but it does not make a mutable upstream script safe. A compromise of the hosting endpoint, its deployment pipeline, the relevant domain or TLS trust chain, or another upstream component could change the effective payload after this Skill has been reviewed.
Installing Ollama supports the documented local-model functionality, but direct
curl | shexecution is not the minimum-risk installation mechanism. A verified package, a pinned release artifact, or a separately downloaded and inspected installer can provide the same functionality with a smaller supply-chain attack surface.No evidence in the audited project indicates that the local
token-monitor.pyscript invokes this command automatically. Exploitation therefore depends on a user following the README instructions.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installer content served by
https://ollama.com/install.sh, or otherwise compromises a trusted part of its delivery chain. - The attacker modifies the remotely hosted script to include arbitrary shell commands.
- A user follows the README installation instructions.
curlretrieves the attacker-controlled content at execution time.- The pipe passes the response directly to
shwithout i ...[truncated 1174 chars]
- An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installer content served by
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Remove the direct network-to-shell pipeline.
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Prefer installation from an authenticated operating-system package repository or another trusted package manager.
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If an installer script is necessary, reference a version-pinned release artifact rather than a mutable endpoint.
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Download the artifact as a separate step so users can inspect it before execution.
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Publish and verify a cryptographic signature using a trusted, independently distributed public key. At minimum, verify a release-specific checksum obtained through an authenticated channel.
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Execute the installer with ordinary user privileges whenever possible, requesting narrowly scoped elevation only for operations that require it.
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Document the files, packages, services, and privileges the installer is expected to use.
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Use a safer installation pattern such as:
bash curl -fL --output ollama-install.sh \ "https://example.invalid/ollama/releases/<PINNED_VERSION>/install.sh" echo "<EXPECTED_SHA256> ollama-install.sh" | sha256sum --check - less ollama-install.sh sh ollama-install.shThe placeholder URL, pinned version, and checksum must be replaced with values published and authenticated by the trusted upstream release process.
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