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Security audit

Xiaohongshu (RedNote) Note Search API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it claims, but its JustOneAPI token handling exposes credentials through command-line arguments and URL query strings, so it should be reviewed before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable sending your Xiaohongshu search terms and JustOneAPI token to JustOneAPI. Prefer a short-lived, low-scope token, avoid logging command invocations or full request URLs, and rotate the token if it may have appeared in process logs, shell history, proxy logs, or API request logs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/run.mjs:192
Finding
API Token Exposed Through Process Arguments and URL Query Parameters## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `bin/run.mjs:17-27, 192-211, 260-270, 298-309, 341-349`; `SKILL.md:53-61` **Vulnerability Type**: Credential exposure through command-line arguments and URL query strings **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code `bin/run.mjs:17-27` defines the access token as a query parameter: ```js { "defaultValue": null, "description": "Access token for this API service.", "enumValues": [], "location": "query", "name": "token", "required": true, "schemaType": "string" }, ``` `bin/run.mjs:192-211` adds all query parameters, including the token, to the URL and sends it: ```js const baseUrl = manifest.baseUrl; const url = new URL(operation.path, ensureBaseUrl(baseUrl)); applyPathParams(operation, params, url); applyQueryParams(operation, params, url); const requestInit = { headers: { "accept": "application/json", }, method: operation.method, }; if (operation.requestBody && params.body !== undefined) { requestInit.body = JSON.stringify(params.body); requestInit.headers["content-type"] = operation.requestBody.contentType || "application/json"; } let response; try { response = await fetch(url, requestInit); ``` `bin/run.mjs:260-270` accepts the credential as a process command-line argument: ```js if (flag === "--params-json") { parsed.paramsJson = value; index += 1; continue; } if (flag === "--token") { parsed.token = value; index += 1; continue; } fail(`Unknown argument "${flag}".`); ``` `bin/run.mjs:298-309` transfers the command-line token into the request parameters: ```js function injectToken(operation, params, cliToken) { const tokenParam = operation.parameters.find((parameter) => parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` `bin/run.mjs:341-349` serializes the tok ...[truncated 3462 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. **Remove command-line token handling.** Read the credential directly from `process.env.JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN` so it is not included in the process argument vector. ```js const token = process.env.JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN; if (!token) { fail("JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN is required."); } ``` 2. **Use an authentication header.** If supported by JustOneAPI, transmit the credential using an authorization header rather than a query parameter: ```js const requestInit = { method: operation.method, headers: { accept: "application/json", authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, }, }; ``` 3. **Separate authentication from ordinary parameters.** Remove `token` from the public operation parameter definitions and reject `token` inside `--params-json`. This prevents user-controlled parameter data from overriding the protected credential source. 4. **If query authentication is mandatory**, use short-lived and narrowly scoped tokens. Ensure the client, API gateway, reverse proxy, server, and monitoring systems redact the `token` query parameter from access logs, errors, traces, and telemetry. 5. **Update the documentation.** Replace the `--token "$JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN"` example with environment-only invocation and clearly document any unavoidable query-string exposure. 6. **Rotate potentially exposed credentials.** Tokens previously used through this helper should be rotated if process arguments, command execution, or request URLs may have been logged.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (14)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "Access token for this API service.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "Access token for this API service.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "Access token for this API service.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The API requires an access token to be supplied as a query parameter, which is an unsafe credential-handling pattern. Query parameters are commonly logged by clients, proxies, analytics systems, browser history, and server infrastructure, increasing the likelihood of token exposure and unauthorized reuse.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "Access token for this API service.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
This second operation repeats the same insecure pattern of transmitting the access token in the URL query string. Because the skill is an interface to an external API, this materially increases credential leakage risk across logging, monitoring, and intermediary systems.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
| Name | In | Required | Type | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `token` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Access token for this API service. |
| `keyword` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Search keyword. |
| `page` | `query` | no | `integer` | `1` | Page number for pagination. |
| `sort` | `query` | no | `string` | `general` | Sort order for the result set.
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill documents direct use of an access token in a URL query parameter, which is a credential exposure pattern because URLs are routinely captured in logs, monitoring systems, caches, and referer headers. In an API-integration skill, this is more dangerous because users may copy the example pattern directly into production workflows, causing persistent secret leakage.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
| Name | In | Required | Type | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `token` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Access token for this API service. |
| `keyword` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Search keyword. |
| `page` | `query` | no | `integer` | `1` | Page number for pagination. |
| `sort` | `query` | no | `string` | `general` | Sort order for the result set.
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
This second endpoint repeats the same unsafe credential pattern by requiring the access token in the query string, creating the same exposure surface across another API version. Repetition across versions increases the likelihood that insecure handling becomes entrenched across clients and documentation examples.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill invokes a network-capable helper (`node {baseDir}/bin/run.mjs`) and requires an API token, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as `permissions` or `allowed-tools`. That creates an authorization gap where a host agent may permit broader network access than intended, reducing reviewability and weakening least-privilege controls.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill requires an access token and places it in the URL query string when calling an external API. Query parameters are commonly exposed via logs, browser history, proxy/CDN logs, monitoring systems, and error traces, so this handling increases the chance of credential leakage even if TLS is used.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The manifest exposes that both the user's search keyword and an access token are sent to an external service, but it does not disclose this data flow to the user. This is dangerous because users or integrators may unknowingly transmit sensitive search terms and credentials to a third-party API, creating privacy and secret-handling risks.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The documentation requires an access token to be sent as a query parameter but provides no warning that query strings are commonly logged by servers, proxies, analytics tools, browser history, and error reports. In a skill context, this can normalize unsafe credential handling and increase the chance that integrators expose long-lived API credentials during routine use.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The manifest text requires specific Chinese strings such as `一天内`, `一周内`, and `半年内` as accepted values, which imposes a language-specific interaction constraint. There is no accompanying opt-in, alternative localized values, or explanation that this locale restriction is required for a region-specific API.

Vague Triggers

Low
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
This is a manifest-style JSON file, so vague-trigger review applies. The description says the skill is for searching Xiaohongshu notes by keyword, but it does not define any explicit invocation phrases, scope limits, or exclusion conditions, which can make activation criteria ambiguous in systems that infer triggers from manifest text.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The noteTime parameter exposes only Chinese-language enum values such as “一天内”, “一周内”, and “半年内”. This imposes a specific language/locale in the interface without offering a language choice or documenting why the locale restriction is necessary.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding
The `noteTime` parameter only documents Chinese-language enum values such as `一天内`, `一周内`, and `半年内`, but the surrounding documentation does not explain that this endpoint is intentionally locale-specific or that users must opt into Chinese values. This can be a natural-language locale policy issue because it imposes a specific language constraint without explicit justification in the file.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.secret_argv_exposure

Instructions pass high-value credentials through process argv.

Critical
Code
suspicious.secret_argv_exposure
Location
SKILL.md:53