Security audit

Xiaohongshu Creator Marketplace (Pugongying) Data Summary API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is narrowly scoped to one JustOneAPI lookup, but it handles the API token in ways that can expose it through command lines and URL query strings.

Review this before installing if your JustOneAPI token has billing or broad account access. Use a narrowly scoped or short-lived token if available, avoid logging commands or full request URLs, and rotate the token if you suspect command-line or URL logs captured it.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: bin/run.mjs:20
Finding: API Token Exposure Through Command-Line Arguments and URL Query Parameters
Content: View full analysis
parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` All parameters marked as query parameters—including the token—are appended to the URL before the network request: ```javascript applyQueryParams(operation, params, url); const requestInit = { headers: { "accept": "application/json", }, method: operation.method, }; if (operation.requestBody && params.body !== undefined) { requestInit.body = JSON.stringify(params.body); requestInit.headers["content-type"] = operation.requestBody.contentType || "application/json"; } let response; try { response = await fetch(url, requestInit); } catch (error) { fail("Network request failed.", { cause: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error), operationId: operation.operationId, }); } ``` ```javascript function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const parameter of operation.parameters.filter((item) => item.location === "query")) ...[truncated 3072 chars]
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

Category: MCP Least Privilege
Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The skill invokes a network-capable helper (node .../bin/run.mjs) and requires an API token, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates a policy gap where an agent or platform may permit broader tool/network use than reviewers or users expect, reducing containment and auditability for outbound requests.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The skill requires the authentication token to be passed as a query parameter and appends it into the request URL. Query-string secrets are commonly exposed through logs, browser/history equivalents, proxy infrastructure, monitoring tools, and error reports, so the token may be disclosed outside the intended trust boundary even when HTTPS is used.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The manifest explicitly requires transmission of a sensitive authentication token and a creator user ID in query parameters, yet provides no user-facing warning about what data is being sent to a third-party API. This creates a real risk of inadvertent credential disclosure and privacy exposure, especially because query parameters are commonly logged by clients, proxies, and servers.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 83% confidence
Finding: This manifest-style JSON describes what the skill does but does not define any explicit trigger phrases, invocation constraints, or exclusion conditions. For manifest files, missing specificity about when a skill should activate can lead to overly broad or unintended invocation by an agent.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.secret_argv_exposure

Instructions pass high-value credentials through process argv.

Critical

Code: suspicious.secret_argv_exposure
Location: SKILL.md:43