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Security audit

Xiaohongshu Creator Marketplace (Pugongying) Follower Growth History API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a focused JustOneAPI wrapper, but it handles the API token in command-line arguments and URL query parameters where it can be exposed in logs or process inspection.

Install only if you trust JustOneAPI and are comfortable sending your token and requested Xiaohongshu user IDs to that service. Use a narrowly scoped, revocable token, avoid pasting token values into chat or logs, and rotate the token if you suspect it appeared in command history, process listings, proxy logs, or API logs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/run.mjs:242
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments and URL Query Parameters

Content
View full analysis
"}' ``` `bin/run.mjs:23-31`: ```js { "defaultValue": null, "description": "User authentication token.", "enumValues": [], "location": "query", "name": "token", "required": true, "schemaType": "string" } ``` `bin/run.mjs:107-109`: ```js applyDefaults(operation, params); injectToken(operation, params, args.token); validateRequired(operation, params); ``` `bin/run.mjs:131`: ```js response = await fetch(url, requestInit); ``` `bin/run.mjs:242-249`: ```js function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const parameter of operation.parameters.filter((item) => item.location === "query")) { const value = params[parameter.name]; if (value === undefined) { continue; } appendValue(url.searchParams, parameter.name, value); } } ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented invocation expands `JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN` into a `--token` command-line argument. Depending on operating-system configuration and local privileges, command-line arguments can be visible through process inspection tools, process-management interfaces, audit systems, diagnostic tooling, or shell history if users invoke the command with a literal token. The implementation then defines the token as a query parameter and appends it to the request URL. Although the destination is fixed to `https://api.justoneapi.com` and HTTPS protects the request from ordinary network interception, query-string credentials can still be recorded by upstream servers, reverse proxies, gateways, access logs, monitoring systems, error reports, and URL-oriente ...[truncated 1567 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
"}' ``` 5. If the upstream service only supports query-string authentication: - Continue using the fixed HTTPS origin. - Ensure clients, proxies, gateways, and server logs redact the `token` parameter. - Never include the complete request URL in errors or telemetry. - Use short-lived, narrowly scoped tokens and support prompt revocation and rotation. - Clearly document the residual query-string credential exposure. 6. Add automated tests verifying that tokens never appear in standard output, standard error, exception details, telemetry, or serialized request diagnostics. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a network-capable helper (node .../bin/run.mjs) and requires an API token, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates a policy gap where a host agent may permit broader tool use than intended, reducing sandboxing and making unintended outbound requests or tool misuse harder to constrain and audit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This code performs a network request after placing a required authentication token into query parameters, which transmits credential-like data to an external API. Although the manifest describes the token parameter, there is no confirmation prompt, user-facing log, or explicit warning in the executable flow that credentials and request data will be sent off-host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest requires a token query parameter for an external API but provides no user-facing warning that credentials will be transmitted to a third-party service. Sending authentication material in query parameters also increases exposure risk through logs, browser history, analytics, and intermediary systems, especially compared with headers or managed secret handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The API documentation requires an authentication token to be passed as a query parameter, which is routinely exposed in browser history, reverse proxies, server access logs, analytics tools, and referrer headers. Even though this file is documentation rather than executable code, it encourages an insecure integration pattern that can lead to credential leakage and unauthorized API access if consumers implement it as described.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
74% confidence
Finding

The skill's natural-language descriptions and all emitted user-facing messages are fixed in English, with no indication that users may select another language or locale. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a policy concern unless clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This manifest-style JSON describes what the skill does but does not specify when it should be invoked, what user requests should match it, or any exclusion conditions. In a skill-routing context, the broad analytics description could overlap with many generic requests about followers, trends, or audience analysis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.secret_argv_exposure

Instructions pass high-value credentials through process argv.

Critical
Code
suspicious.secret_argv_exposure
Location
SKILL.md:45