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Security audit

Weibo User Followers API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it claims, but it handles the API token in ways that can expose it through command-line arguments and URL query strings.

Review before installing. Use only a scoped, low-privilege JustOneAPI token, rotate it if exposed, avoid shared logs or screenshots of invocations, and confirm you are allowed to collect the Weibo follower/profile data being requested.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/run.mjs:154
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Process Arguments and URL Query Parameters

Content
View full analysis
"}' ``` ```markdown - Required: `JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN` - Pass the token with `--token "$JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN"`; do not paste token values into chat messages, screenshots, or logs. ``` `bin/run.mjs:76-88`: ```js const baseUrl = manifest.baseUrl; const url = new URL(operation.path, ensureBaseUrl(baseUrl)); applyPathParams(operation, params, url); applyQueryParams(operation, params, url); const requestInit = { headers: { "accept": "application/json", }, method: operation.method, }; ``` `bin/run.mjs:154-166`: ```js function injectToken(operation, params, cliToken) { const tokenParam = operation.parameters.find((parameter) => parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` `bin/run.mjs:207-216`: ```js function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const parameter of operation.parameters.filter((item) => item.location === "query")) { const value = params[parameter.name]; if (value === undefined) { continue; } appendValue(url.searchParams, parameter.name, value); } } ``` `generated/operations.json:16-24`: ```json { "defaultValue": null, "description": "API access token.", "enumValues": [], "location": ...[truncated 2719 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/run.mjs (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

js
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "API access token.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This finding reflects that the operation explicitly requests an access token, which is expected for an authenticated API, but in this skill it is collected in an unsafe way as a normal query parameter. The dangerous aspect is not authentication itself, but that the credential can be exposed through URL logging and retained in infrastructure outside the user's control.

Content

Scanner excerpt · generated/operations.json (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

json
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "API access token.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Placing an API access token in a query parameter is a real credential-handling weakness because query strings are commonly captured in browser history, proxy logs, analytics, server logs, and monitoring systems. In this skill context, the token is required for a third-party API call, so any implementation following this spec may unintentionally leak reusable credentials beyond the intended recipient.

Content

Scanner excerpt · generated/operations.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
| Name | In | Required | Type | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `token` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | API access token. |
| `uid` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Weibo User ID (UID). |
| `page` | `query` | no | `integer` | `1` | Page number, starting with 1. |

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a network-capable helper (node .../bin/run.mjs) against an external API but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. This creates an authorization and review gap: consumers cannot easily tell that the skill will make outbound requests and transmit user-supplied identifiers to a third party, which weakens least-privilege controls and auditing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill defines the API access token as a query parameter and the runtime appends it directly to the request URL. Query-string credentials are commonly exposed through logs, browser/history systems, proxies, monitoring tools, and error traces, so the token can leak even when HTTPS is used.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill defines the API access token as a query parameter, which is commonly logged by clients, proxies, gateways, browser history, and monitoring systems. Even though the endpoint uses HTTPS, placing secrets in the URL materially increases the chance of credential exposure and replay by unintended parties.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill is designed to retrieve third-party follower and profile metadata, including verification signals, but it does not provide a user-facing warning that this action exposes third-party social graph data through an external service. That omission can mislead users about privacy, consent, and downstream handling of personal/profile data, especially in network-analysis use cases.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This is a markdown file, so SQP-2 applies to omissions in the skill description. The parameter list indicates an API access token is required, but the document provides no warning that credentials will be sent to an external service or guidance on safe handling of the token.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.secret_argv_exposure

Instructions pass high-value credentials through process argv.

Critical
Code
suspicious.secret_argv_exposure
Location
SKILL.md:42