Security audit

TikTok User Profile API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a focused JustOneAPI TikTok profile lookup skill, with the main caution being that its API token is passed through the command line and URL query string.

Install only if you are comfortable sending your JustOneAPI token and TikTok lookup parameters to api.justoneapi.com. Use a narrowly scoped token if available, avoid pasting token values into chats or logs, and rotate the token if you suspect command-line history, process telemetry, or URL logs may have captured it.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: bin/run.mjs:25
Finding: API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments and URL Query Parameters
Content: View full analysis
parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` All parameters marked as query parameters, including the token, are appended to the URL: ```js function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const parameter of operation.parameters.filter((item) => item.location === "query")) { const value = params[parameter.name]; if (value === undefined) { continue; } appendValue(url.searchParams, parameter.name, value); } } ``` The resulting URL is transmitted to the declared JustOneAPI endpoint: ```js response = await fetch(url, requestInit); ``` The documented invocation also places the secret in the process command line: ```bash node {baseDir}/bin/run.mjs --operation "getTiktokUserDetailV1" --token "$JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN" --params-json '{"key":"value"}' ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill must authenticate to `https://api.justoneapi.com` to provide its declared TikTok profil ...[truncated 2277 chars]
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

Category: MCP Least Privilege
Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The skill invokes a network-capable helper (node .../run.mjs) that sends requests to an external API, but the manifest does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization and transparency gap: a host or reviewer cannot easily enforce that the skill is only permitted to use the network in the intended way, which increases the risk of unintended outbound requests or misuse if the skill is modified or composed with other logic.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The skill defines the API security token as a query parameter and automatically appends it to the request URL. Query-string secrets are commonly exposed through logs, browser/history layers, intermediary monitoring, reverse proxies, and error reporting systems, making credential leakage more likely even when HTTPS is used.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The skill requires a sensitive API token and places it in a query parameter, but the manifest provides no user-facing warning that a secret will be transmitted to a third-party service. Query-string tokens are commonly exposed in logs, analytics, browser history, and intermediary infrastructure, increasing the chance of credential leakage and unauthorized API use.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 76% confidence
Finding: This JSON file is a manifest-style interface definition, so vague-trigger checks apply. The description states what API call the skill makes but provides no activation constraints, trigger phrases, or exclusion conditions, which can make it unclear when the skill should be selected versus other TikTok-related skills.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.