Back to skill

Security audit

TikTok Comment Replies API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a narrow JustOneAPI wrapper for one TikTok comment-replies endpoint, with a real but disclosed credential-handling risk.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill a JustOneAPI token for TikTok comment-reply lookups. Prefer a narrowly scoped or short-lived token, avoid shell tracing or shared machines when running it, and rotate the token if you suspect process arguments or request URLs may have been logged.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/run.mjs:222
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Process Arguments and URL Query Parameters

Content
View full analysis
","commentId":""}' ``` ## Environment - Required: `JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN` - Pass the token with `--token "$JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN"`; do not paste token values into chat messages, screenshots, or logs. ``` The executable injects that command-line token into the request parameters: ```js const params = parseParams(args.paramsJson); applyDefaults(operation, params); injectToken(operation, params, args.token); validateRequired(operation, params); ``` The token is then treated as a query parameter and appended to the outbound URL: ```js function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const parameter of operation.parameters.filter((item) => item.location === "query")) { const value = params[parameter.name]; if (value === undefined) { continue; } appendValue(url.searchParams, parameter.name, value); } } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill legitimately requires a JustOneAPI credential to perform its declared operation, and the destination is fixed to the documented HTTPS service at `api.justoneapi.com`. The outbound transfer is therefore not covert credential exfiltration and does not exceed the functional endpoint scope. However, the credential is handled through two exposure-prone channels: 1. The shell expands `"$JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN"` into the Node process argument list. Depending on operating-system permissions and telemetry configuration, process-monitoring tools, diagnostic collectors, shell tracing, or other local users may be able to rec ...[truncated 1966 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
","commentId":""}' ``` 6. Add automated tests confirming that errors, standard output, and standard error never contain the token. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a network-capable helper (node {baseDir}/bin/run.mjs) to call an external API, but the manifest does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a policy and review gap: an agent may execute outbound network activity without an explicit, auditable declaration, increasing the risk of unintended data egress or overbroad capability use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill defines the API security token as a query parameter and injects it into the request URL, which causes the secret to appear in places URLs are commonly logged or retained, such as browser history, proxies, server access logs, observability tooling, and error reports. This increases the chance of credential disclosure compared with sending the token in an Authorization header or other header-based secret transport.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.