T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- bin/run.mjs:18
- Finding
- API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments and URL Query Parameters## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:51`; `bin/run.mjs:18-24, 132, 148, 235-246, 278-288`; `generated/operations.json:13-19`; `generated/operations.md:17` **Vulnerability Type**: Credential exposure through process arguments and URL query strings **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code The operation defines the authentication token as a query parameter: ```js { "defaultValue": null, "description": "User authentication token.", "enumValues": [], "location": "query", "name": "token", "required": true, "schemaType": "string" }, ``` The command-line token is copied into the query parameters: ```js function injectToken(operation, params, cliToken) { const tokenParam = operation.parameters.find((parameter) => parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` All query parameters, including the token, are appended to the request URL: ```js function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const parameter of operation.parameters.filter((item) => item.location === "query")) { const value = params[parameter.name]; if (value === undefined) { continue; } appendValue(url.searchParams, parameter.name, value); } } function appendValue(searchParams, name, value) { if (Array.isArray(value)) { for (const item of value) { appendValue(searchParams, name, item); } return; } if (value && typeof value === "object") { searchParams.append(name, JSON.stringify(value)); return; } searchParams.append(name, String(value)); } ``` The resulting URL is sent to the fixed remote service: ```js applyQuer ...[truncated 3411 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. **Remove command-line token handling.** Read the credential directly from `process.env.JUST_ONE_API_TOKEN` so it is not expanded into the process argument vector. Reject explicit tokens inside `--params-json`. 2. **Use an authorization header.** If supported by JustOneAPI, transmit the credential using an appropriate header, such as `Authorization: Bearer ...`, and remove `token` from the operation's query-parameter manifest. 3. **Update generated definitions and documentation.** Change `generated/operations.json`, `generated/operations.md`, and `SKILL.md` so they no longer classify or demonstrate the token as a URL query parameter or CLI argument. 4. **Prevent accidental logging.** Never print the request URL, authorization header, environment variable, or full request configuration. Add centralized redaction for fields named `token`, `authorization`, `apiKey`, or equivalent. 5. **Harden unavoidable query authentication.** If the upstream API mandates a query token, configure clients, gateways, proxies, access logs, APM products, and error-reporting systems to redact the `token` parameter. Avoid redirects and keep the fixed HTTPS destination. 6. **Limit credential impact.** Use short-lived, narrowly scoped tokens with rate limits and quota alerts. Provide a documented revocation and rotation procedure for suspected disclosure. 7. **Add regression tests.** Verify that the token never appears in command arguments, generated URLs, standard output, standard error, exception details, or captured logs.