Back to skill

Security audit

Douyin Creator Marketplace (Xingtu) Audience Touchpoint Distribution API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a narrowly scoped JustOneAPI helper for one Douyin/Xingtu read-only API endpoint, with a credential-handling caveat but no evidence of hidden, persistent, destructive, or deceptive behavior.

Install only if you trust JustOneAPI with this token and need this specific Douyin/Xingtu endpoint. Prefer a narrowly scoped, revocable token, avoid sharing command output or logs, and be aware the current helper passes the token as a process argument and URL query parameter, which can appear in local process telemetry or server-side URL logs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/run.mjs:151
Finding

API Credential Exposed Through Process Arguments and URL Query Parameters

Content
View full analysis
"}' ``` The token is copied from the command-line argument into the request parameters: ```js function injectToken(operation, params, cliToken) { const tokenParam = operation.parameters.find((parameter) => parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` It is then serialized into the URL query string: ```js function appendValue(searchParams, name, value) { if (Array.isArray(value)) { for (const item of value) { appendValue(searchParams, name, item); } return; } if (value && typeof value === "object") { searchParams.append(name, JSON.stringify(value)); return; } searchParams.append(name, String(value)); } ``` ### Technical Analysis Passing secrets through command-line arguments can expose them to process inspection, shell or execution telemetry, debugging tools, and process-monitoring systems, depending on the operating-system configuration and trust boundaries. Placing the token in the URL query string creates an additional exposure surface. Although HTTPS protects the URL in transit from passive network observers, the complete URL may still be retained by the API server, reverse proxies ...[truncated 2066 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a network-capable helper (node .../bin/run.mjs) and is explicitly designed to call a remote API, but it does not declare any permissions or allowed-tools scope. That mismatch weakens least-privilege controls and can cause the runtime or reviewers to underestimate what the skill can do, increasing the risk of unintended outbound requests or misuse of the provided API token.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This code performs a network request after placing the required token query parameter onto the request URL, which sends authentication data to an external API. Although the parameter is described internally as a user authentication token, there is no confirmation prompt, user-facing log/print, or warning comment/docstring disclosing that credential transmission occurs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Passing an authentication token in the query string is dangerous because URLs are commonly logged by servers, proxies, observability tools, browser history, and intermediary infrastructure. Even over HTTPS, query parameters are more likely to be exposed operationally than headers, which increases the risk of credential leakage and unauthorized API access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The natural-language description and display name are fixed to the Douyin Creator Marketplace (Xingtu) context, which is a specific regional/platform locale. There is no indication of user opt-in, alternative locale handling, or justification in the file for this locale-specific constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This manifest-style JSON describes what the skill does but does not specify when it should or should not be invoked, nor does it provide narrow trigger phrases or exclusion conditions. For manifest files, that absence of activation specificity can make downstream invocation logic overly broad or ambiguous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.