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Security audit

Bilibili Share Link Resolution API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims, but users should understand that their JustOneAPI token is passed on the command line and sent to the provider as a URL query parameter.

Install only if you trust JustOneAPI with the token and share URL. Prefer a narrowly scoped or disposable API token if the service supports it, and rotate the token if it may have appeared in logs, shell history, process monitoring, or URL telemetry.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/run.mjs:74
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Process Arguments and URL Query Parameters

Content
View full analysis
"}' ``` The main request flow injects the token into the parameter object, appends query parameters to the URL, and sends the resulting request: ```js const params = parseParams(args.paramsJson); applyDefaults(operation, params); injectToken(operation, params, args.token); validateRequired(operation, params); const baseUrl = manifest.baseUrl; const url = new URL(operation.path, ensureBaseUrl(baseUrl)); applyPathParams(operation, params, url); applyQueryParams(operation, params, url); const requestInit = { headers: { "accept": "application/json", }, method: operation.method, }; if (operation.requestBody && params.body !== undefined) { requestInit.body = JSON.stringify(params.body); requestInit.headers["content-type"] = operation.requestBody.contentType || "application/json"; } let response; try { response = await fetch(url, requestInit); ``` The token is copied from the command line into the general request parameters: ```js function injectToken(operation, params, cliToken) { const tokenParam = operation.parameters.find((parameter) => parameter.name === "token"); if (!tokenParam || params.token !== undefined) { return; } if (!cliToken) { fail("--token is required for this operation.", { operationId: operation.operationId, }); } params.token = cliToken; } ``` All query parameters, including `token`, are appended directly to the request URL: ```js function applyQueryParams(operation, params, url) { for (const ...[truncated 3380 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This finding reflects that the skill requests an access token and transmits it as input to an external API. Accessing credentials is not inherently malicious here because the token is needed for legitimate API use, but the way it is collected and sent via query parameter creates unnecessary exposure risk if the token is captured from URLs or logs.

Content

Scanner excerpt · generated/operations.json (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

json
"parameters": [
        {
          "defaultValue": null,
          "description": "Access token for the API.",
          "enumValues": [],
          "location": "query",
          "name": "token",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/run.mjs (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

js
| Name | In | Required | Type | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `token` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Access token for the API. |
| `shareUrl` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Bilibili share URL (must start with https://b23.tv/). |

### Request body

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · generated/operations.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
| Name | In | Required | Type | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `token` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Access token for the API. |
| `shareUrl` | `query` | yes | `string` | n/a | Bilibili share URL (must start with https://b23.tv/). |

### Request body

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a networked helper (node {baseDir}/bin/run.mjs ...) and is explicitly designed to call a remote API, but it does not declare any permissions or allowed-tools scope. This creates a transparency and policy-enforcement gap: an agent platform may permit broader execution than intended or fail to present the network capability to reviewers/users, increasing the risk of unreviewed outbound requests and data exfiltration through the provided shareUrl or API token.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill sends the API access token as a URL query parameter, which is routinely exposed in logs, browser/history artifacts, proxy records, monitoring systems, and error telemetry. Even though the request uses HTTPS, query-string secrets have a larger accidental disclosure surface than headers, so the token can be leaked to operators or downstream systems that capture request URLs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest explicitly places an API access token in a URL query parameter. Query parameters are commonly exposed in logs, browser history, proxy caches, monitoring tools, and referrer data, so this design increases the chance of credential leakage even when HTTPS is used. The skill context makes this more dangerous because the token is required for every request and there is no warning or safer authentication mechanism documented.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.