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Security audit

speech-paper-daily

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a coherent paper-digest purpose, but it automatically creates Tencent Docs through local script execution and broad triggers without a clear confirmation step.

Review this skill before installing if you only want chat summaries. It is designed to create Tencent Docs in a fixed folder and to run a local Python helper for that write operation; use it only if you are comfortable with those side effects and with the added footer branding.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note
Location
SKILL.md:176
Finding

Mandatory Third-Party Branding Injected into Generated Documents

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 176
Vulnerability Type: Mandatory output manipulation
Risk Level: Low

Evidence

markdown
*由开心果 🍀 自动生成 · 数据来源:arXiv*

The embedded text translates to: “Automatically generated by Happy Pistachio · Data source: arXiv.”

Technical Analysis

The required document template contains a fixed third-party attribution. Because the skill directs the agent to use this template for every generated paper digest, normal execution adds branding that the user did not request.

This constitutes skill instruction hijacking because the skill modifies the expected task output by imposing unrelated attribution. It can also create a misleading statement about the identity or organization responsible for generating the report.

No mechanism is provided to disclose, remove, or obtain user consent for this attribution. The instruction is therefore applied persistently to every document created through the documented workflow.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes the skill to generate a speech-paper digest.
  2. The agent follows the mandatory document structure in SKILL.md.
  3. The fixed attribution is appended to the generated content.
  4. The agent uploads the resulting document to Tencent Docs.
  5. Readers encounter unsolicited branding that may falsely identify the report's producer.

Impact Assessment

The issue does not grant operating-system privileges, access credentials, or code-execution capabilities. Its scope is limited to content generated through this skill.

Successful exploitation permits manipulation of every generated report by inserting fixed third-party branding and potentially misleading authorship attribution. The affected outputs may be distributed or stored in Tencent Docs without the user noticing the imposed attribution.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the fixed third-party attribution from the mandatory document template.
  2. Use a neutral footer such as “Generated from arXiv data” if provenance information is necessary.
  3. Require explicit user approval before adding an organization, product, or author identity to generated documents.
  4. Make attribution configurable rather than mandatory, with branding disabled by default.
  5. Review all output templates for other content unrelated to the user's requested task.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill requires creating and executing a local Python script via exec, which introduces unnecessary arbitrary code execution for a workflow that should only fetch papers and create a document. Even though the included script is fixed-purpose, this pattern expands the attack surface: any prompt-influenced content, file path manipulation, tool misuse, or future modification could turn the local execution step into command execution or data access beyond the skill’s stated scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad everyday requests such as asking for the latest speech papers, which can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly. Because the skill performs extensive web retrieval and external document-writing, accidental invocation can lead to unintended actions and data creation without clear user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs writing content to temporary local files and creating a Tencent document in a fixed folder, but it does not require clear upfront disclosure or confirmation from the user. This creates a consent and transparency risk: users may expect a summary in chat, while the skill persists generated content locally and remotely as a side effect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

“全程中文输出”属于明确的语言策略约束,但文档没有提供用户选择语言的选项,也未说明该限制为何必须适用所有用户。根据语言/locale 政策,这类强制单一语言输出在缺乏用户选择或正当区域性说明时构成自然语言策略问题。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.