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Security audit

OpenClaw MiniMax Media

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward install and configuration guide for a MiniMax OpenClaw plugin, with a supply-chain caution around its default unversioned npm install command.

Before installing, prefer the specific-version command, verify the npm package and GitHub source you intend to trust, keep the MiniMax API key out of committed files, and understand that enabling the plugin will add persistent OpenClaw tools that can send relevant prompts or media requests to MiniMax-backed services.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:21
Finding
Unversioned Third-Party Plugin Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 21-25 **Vulnerability Type**: Unversioned third-party dependency installation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Install Install the plugin: ```bash openclaw plugins install npm:@jwongart/openclaw-minimax-media --pin ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The primary installation procedure installs executable plugin code from a third-party npm scope without specifying an explicitly reviewed version. The `--pin` option may record the version resolved during installation, but it does not make the initial package resolution deterministic or ensure that the retrieved release has undergone security review. Consequently, the command may install whichever package version the registry resolves at execution time. If the publisher account, npm package, release process, or registry delivery path is compromised, a malicious release could be installed before it is pinned. The project also documents an explicit-version installation command, but presents the unversioned command as the default. The repository contains only `SKILL.md`; the referenced npm package implementation is not included. Therefore, this audit cannot determine whether the current external package is malicious or assess its internal security. The confirmed issue is the unsafe dependency acquisition pattern, not confirmed malicious behavior by the package. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release process, or another relevant supply-chain component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version of `@jwongart/openclaw-minimax-media`. 3. A user or agent follows the default unversioned installation command from `SKILL.md`. 4. npm resolves the malicious release and OpenClaw installs it as executable plugin code. 5. The plugin is enabled and configured with a MiniMax API key. 6. Malicious initialization or tool-handling code may execute with the permissions available to the OpenClaw ...[truncated 811 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the default installation command with an explicitly reviewed and approved version: ```bash openclaw plugins install npm:@jwongart/openclaw-minimax-media@0.8.8 --pin ``` 2. Update the pinned version only after reviewing the corresponding source commit, release notes, and published npm artifact. 3. Verify package provenance, signatures, and integrity metadata where supported. Record the expected artifact digest in trusted release documentation. 4. Ensure that the npm package version corresponds to an authenticated GitHub release and reviewed source revision. 5. Run the plugin with least privilege, restricting filesystem access, environment variables, network destinations, and operating-system permissions where the platform supports isolation. 6. Provide the MiniMax API key through a protected secret store or environment-injection mechanism rather than plaintext configuration, and scope or rotate the key where supported. 7. Establish a controlled upgrade process that tests new releases in an isolated environment before production installation. 8. Monitor npm ownership and maintainer changes because unexpected publisher changes can indicate a supply-chain takeover.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.