Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This check-in tool needs review because its login cleanup can close unrelated programs and its request previews can expose account credentials.
Have login cleanup restricted to the browser process this tool created before using that flow. Keep certificate verification enabled. Enter credentials locally and redact all secrets from captured requests, previews, logs, and chat. Protect config.json and browser-profile, and enable only intended sites and schedules. Inspection covered the full bundle, with isolated synthetic checks; live browser and service behavior remain untested.
External input (network, user) flows to a code execution sink. This enables remote code execution or command injection.
if ask_yes("现在立即测试一次？"):
import subprocess
subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(BASE_DIR / "claim.py"), "--config", str(path), "--site", sid])
return 0
The guide instructs users to share a complete captured request after removing only Cookie data, although it explicitly discusses Authorization tokens and other authentication headers elsewhere. Following this advice can expose reusable credentials, signed URLs, or private request bodies to the assistant service or anyone receiving the capture.
The guide explicitly forces all time calculations to Beijing time, overriding the system timezone. It provides neither user opt-in nor a justification tying this locale constraint to the target sites' requirements.
The troubleshooting table recommends disabling certificate verification as a routine fix without explaining the loss of server authentication. For authenticated check-in requests, this can let an attacker controlling the network intercept session credentials or alter responses.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
if ask_yes("现在立即测试一次？"):
import subprocess
subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(BASE_DIR / "claim.py"), "--config", str(path), "--site", sid])
return 0
The login workflow calls kill_tree on a fixed port before launching its dedicated browser, without establishing that any existing listener belongs to this workflow. Port-based termination can consequently disrupt an unrelated process and its children, potentially losing unsaved work; the login description does not disclose that side effect.
Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.
self.port = port
def _get(self, path):
return json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(
f"<redacted-url>}", timeout=10).read())
def page_ws(self, url=None, timeout=30):
Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.
def page_ws(self, url=None, timeout=30):
"""拿到一个 page target 的 ws 地址；必要时新开一个。"""
if url:
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"<redacted-url>, safe=':/?=&')}",
method="PUT")
try:
L003 explicitly says the module implements only connecting to a page target, sending Runtime.evaluate, and reading results. However, L160–L165 separately invoke Network.getCookies and return cookie records, defaulting to WorkBuddy URLs; this exposes authentication-sensitive data beyond the expressly documented operations.
The cookies method retrieves browser cookies through Network.getCookies, which can include authentication and session credentials. Unlike page creation and process termination, this sensitive operation has no explanatory docstring, comment, prompt, or user-facing log, and the module description only mentions connecting to page targets and evaluating expressions.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
kwargs = {}
if os.name == "nt":
kwargs["creationflags"] = 0x00000008 | 0x00000200 # DETACHED | NEW_GROUP
p = subprocess.Popen(args, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, **kwargs)
return p
Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.
deadline = time.time() + timeout
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(f"<redacted-url>", timeout=2).read()
return True
except Exception:
time.sleep(1)
The purported graceful shutdown never sends Browser.close and instead attempts a WebSocket upgrade against an HTTP metadata endpoint. With a normal CDP server this fails and leads to forced process-tree termination, creating avoidable data-loss and availability risks rather than the documented graceful behavior.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
pass
try:
import subprocess
out = subprocess.run(["netstat", "-ano"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
pids = set()
for line in out.splitlines():
if f":{port}" in line and "LISTENING" in line:
The code forcibly terminates a process and all its children based only on a substring match against netstat output. It does not verify browser or profile ownership, and the match can also select other ports containing the requested port text, causing unrelated process termination and data loss.
if f":{port}" in line and "LISTENING" in line:
pids.add(line.split()[-1])
for pid in pids:
subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/PID", pid, "/T", "/F"], capture_output=True)
except Exception:
pass