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Security audit

openprovider

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill matches its OpenProvider management purpose, but it gives an agent powerful registrar, DNS, SSL, and customer-data authority without enough built-in confirmations or secret-handling guidance.

Review before installing. Use a narrowly scoped OpenProvider identity where possible, avoid running the authentication curl examples in logged shells or CI, redact passwords/tokens/EPP codes/PII, and require a fresh explicit confirmation naming the exact domain, DNS zone, customer handle, SSL order, action, and cost before any delete, transfer, purchase, renewal, restore, or DNS-changing operation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Credentials and bearer tokens may be exposed through command-line arguments and terminal output

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
&2 jq -n \ --arg username "$OPENPROVIDER_USERNAME" \ --arg password "$OP_PASS" \ '{username: $username, password: $password}' | curl --fail-with-body --silent --show-error \ -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/auth/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data-binary @- | jq -r '.data.token' ``` 3. Avoid credential-testing examples that print the full response. Return only a success/failure result and reseller identifier, while explicitly removing the token: ```bash # Process the response without printing data.token. jq '{code, desc, reseller_id: .data.reseller_id}' ``` 4. Ensure application and agent logs redact `password`, `Authorization`, `token`, transfer authorization codes, and other sensitive fields. 5. Disable shell tracing around authentication. Documentation should explicitly warn against `set -x` and verbose `curl` output. 6. Store cached tokens only in process memory, never in persistent logs or world-readable files, and clear them on logout, credential rotation, or authentication failure. 7. Use an OpenProvider identity with the narrowest available account permissions. Separate read-only lookup functionality from identities allowed to purchase, modify, transfer, or delete resources. 8. Rotate credentials and invalidate active tokens if the documented commands have previously been executed in recorded terminals or CI/CD environments. ]]>

other

Error
Location
references/domains.md:349
Finding

Destructive registrar operations lack explicit confirmation and authorization safeguards

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (102)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented DELETE /customers/{handle} operation exposes a high-risk parameterized destructive action, and the file provides no guardrails for validating the handle, confirming user intent, or constraining who may invoke it. In an agent context, a malformed, guessed, or attacker-supplied handle could cause deletion attempts against the wrong customer record, leading to service disruption and administrative impact.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/customers-resellers.md (reported line 244)May include surrounding context.

md
## Delete Customer

### DELETE /customers/{handle}

Delete a customer handle. Cannot delete handles assigned to active domains.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes a high-impact destructive operation that deletes an entire DNS zone and all records, and the path parameter is directly user-controlled. In an agent or tool-using context, insufficient confirmation, authorization scoping, or domain validation could let a prompt or user trigger irreversible deletion of critical DNS, causing outage, mail disruption, or takeover opportunities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/dns.md (reported line 238)May include surrounding context.

md
## Delete DNS Zone

### DELETE /dns/zones/{domain}

Delete an entire DNS zone and all its records.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a direct destructive operation, DELETE /domains/{id}, with no embedded safeguards such as identity verification, target read-back, approval requirements, or confirmation sequencing. In an agent context, this creates substantial tool-parameter-abuse risk because a mistaken, manipulated, or ambiguous domain ID can trigger irreversible service disruption, loss of DNS/email, and possible domain loss.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/domains.md (reported line 351)May include surrounding context.

md
## Delete Domain

### DELETE /domains/{id}

Request domain deletion. Domain may enter a redemption grace period depending on TLD.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/nameservers.md (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

md
## Delete Nameserver Group

### DELETE /dns/nameservers/groups/{ns_group}

Delete a nameserver group. Cannot delete groups assigned to active domains.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The documented DELETE operation can directly cancel an SSL certificate order, making it a high-risk action if exposed through an agent without strict parameter validation and intent confirmation. In this skill context, a prompt-injected or mistaken order ID could trigger unauthorized cancellation, leading to certificate loss, service interruption, failed renewals, or emergency remediation work.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ssl.md (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

md
## Cancel SSL Certificate

### DELETE /ssl/orders/{id}

Cancel an SSL certificate order.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to load registrar credentials from environment variables or a database and transmit them to an external authentication endpoint, but it provides no warning about secret handling, redaction, least-privilege use, or avoiding exposure in logs and outputs. In an agent workflow, this omission increases the chance that credentials are mishandled, echoed, persisted, or disclosed during troubleshooting or execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
# Get token
OP_USER="${OPENPROVIDER_USERNAME:-${OPENPROVIDER_USER:-}}"
OP_PASS="${OPENPROVIDER_PASSWORD:-${OPENPROVIDER_PASS:-}}"
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "'"$OP_USER"'", "password": "'"$OP_PASS"'"}' \
  | jq -r '.data.token')

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill includes multiple destructive registrar operations such as deleting domains, deleting DNS zones, deleting customers, and cancelling SSL certificates, but it does not instruct the agent to require explicit user confirmation or warn about irreversible consequences. In an agent context, this creates a real risk of accidental destructive actions from ambiguous prompts or misinterpretation, especially because domain and DNS changes can cause outages or permanent loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

}

text

**curl Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/auth/login \

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes an OpenProvider skill centered on domain registrar, DNS, SSL, WHOIS, and related domain operations, but this file documents full customer-handle CRUD and reseller-account retrieval functionality. While registrant handling is mentioned in the trigger list, broad customer management and reseller account inspection materially extend the documented behavior beyond the primarily domain/DNS scope advertised in the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The create/update examples collect and transmit PII including full name, email, phone, street address, and VAT data to an external registrar API without any warning about sensitivity, minimization, consent, or logging hygiene. In an agent setting, this increases the chance that users or downstream components provide unnecessary personal data or that the data is handled unsafely in prompts, logs, or tool traces.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/customers-resellers.md (reported line 189)May include surrounding context.

}

text

**curl Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/customers \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The delete customer operation is destructive and the documentation provides no warning to require explicit user confirmation, ownership validation, or dependency checks beyond noting active domains cannot be deleted. In an agent-driven workflow, that omission can lead to accidental or unauthorized deletion of customer records, disrupting registrant management and related domain operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/dns.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

}

text

**curl Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/dns/zones \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/domains.md (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

Status values: free (available) | active (taken)

curl Example:

bash
curl -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/domains/check \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/domains.md (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

}

text

**curl Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/domains \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/domains.md (reported line 245)May include surrounding context.

| domain_name_pattern | string | Wildcard search (e.g. *example*) | | extension | string | Filter by TLD |

curl Example:

bash
curl -X GET "https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/domains?limit=50&status=ACT&order_by=expiration_date&order=ASC" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The transfer example includes submission of an auth/EPP code, which is a sensitive secret used to authorize registrar transfer. Documenting this without a privacy warning or handling guidance increases the risk that users or downstream agents expose the code in logs, chats, telemetry, or other unintended channels, enabling unauthorized transfer attempts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes a destructive domain-deletion operation with only minimal lifecycle context and no explicit warning that deletion can immediately disrupt DNS, email, website availability, or ownership continuity. In an agent skill that may translate natural-language requests into registrar actions, lack of confirmation and impact guidance increases the chance of accidental or unauthorized destructive execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/nameservers.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

| offset | integer | Pagination offset | | ns_group_pattern | string | Wildcard search for group names |

curl Example:

bash
curl -X GET "https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/dns/nameservers/groups?limit=100" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents update and delete operations for nameserver groups, including a DELETE endpoint example, but does not warn that changing or removing nameserver groups can affect DNS resolution and domain availability. For markdown files, operations that can affect user data or system integrity should include clear warnings about impact before users act on them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ssl.md (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

}

text

**curl Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/ssl/orders \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The documentation includes a destructive SSL-cancellation operation without any guidance for user confirmation, authorization checks, or warnings about irreversible service impact. In an agent skill context, this increases the chance that an automated workflow could cancel a live certificate based on an ambiguous or malicious prompt, causing outage or trust failures.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
List all available TLDs with pricing and requirements.

**Endpoint:** `GET https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/tlds`

**Query Parameters:**

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
List all available TLDs with pricing and requirements.

**Endpoint:** `GET https://api.openprovider.eu/v1beta/tlds`

**Query Parameters:**