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Security audit

iFlytek Web Search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward iFlytek web-search helper that uses a documented API password only to authenticate to the stated search endpoint.

Install only if you intend to use iFlytek search and are comfortable sending your search queries and the XFYUN_API_PASSWORD credential to iFlytek's search API. Use a dedicated API key with limited quota if possible.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 45, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.py (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

python
)

    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
            return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill requires access to both environment variables and outbound network calls, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a policy and review gap: a host agent may execute the skill with broader capabilities than intended, making secret access and external data exfiltration harder to constrain or audit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The file prominently brands the skill as a Chinese service and includes multiple Chinese-only example queries, which presents a language/locale preference in the user-facing documentation. There is no accompanying statement that other languages are also supported or that users may choose their preferred language.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.