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Security audit

Unzipped Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is coherent, but it needs review because it can move wallet funds, create and post from a public Farcaster account, and stores powerful credentials in plaintext by default.

Review this carefully before installing. Use only a throwaway wallet with minimal funds, assume any printed or plaintext-saved private key may be compromised, prefer `--no-save` or a secure vault, and run dependency installation in a sandbox. Also verify the publisher/source yourself because the artifact claims to be official while the reviewed package only contains documentation and metadata, not the implementation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:30
Finding

Wallet Private Key Disclosed Through Standard Output

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:57
Finding

Custody and Signer Credentials Stored in Plaintext Files

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:4
Finding

Unpinned npm Installation Permits Mutable Dependency and Lifecycle-Script Execution

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill states that sensitive wallet and signer credentials are automatically saved to disk in plaintext JSON. Anyone with filesystem access to those files can take over the Farcaster identity and steal associated wallet funds, making this a serious credential exposure risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

md
### Step 3: Credentials are Saved Automatically

Credentials are automatically saved to:
- `~/.openclaw/farcaster-credentials.json` (if OpenClaw is installed)
- `./credentials.json` (fallback)

**Security Warning:** Credentials are stored as **plain text JSON**. Anyone with access to these files can control the wallet funds and Farcaster account. For production use, implement your own secure storage.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The fallback storage path of ./credentials.json further increases exposure because application working directories are commonly backed up, committed accidentally, or accessible to other local processes. Because the file contains keys that control both funds and account actions, compromise has immediate account and financial consequences.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

md
Credentials are automatically saved to:
- `~/.openclaw/farcaster-credentials.json` (if OpenClaw is installed)
- `./credentials.json` (fallback)

**Security Warning:** Credentials are stored as **plain text JSON**. Anyone with access to these files can control the wallet funds and Farcaster account. For production use, implement your own secure storage.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: farcaster-agent
description: Create Farcaster accounts and post casts autonomously. Official skill from the Farcaster team.
metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"🟣","requires":{"bins":["node","npm"],"env":[]},"install":[{"id":"npm","kind":"shell","command":"cd {baseDir}/.. && npm install","label":"Install dependencies"}]}}
---

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill asks the user to fund a wallet and later states that the setup will bridge/swap assets automatically, but it does not surface this as a prominent up-front warning at the point of use. In an autonomous agent context, hidden financial side effects increase the chance of users authorizing actions they do not fully understand, including cross-chain transactions and fees.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The auto-setup flow includes account registration, signer creation, waiting for sync, and publishing a first cast, but the documentation frames this as a setup convenience rather than emphasizing that it will create a public identity and post publicly. In an agent setting, this can cause unintended irreversible public actions and persistent account state changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

fname: 'myusername', displayName: 'My Display Name', bio: 'I am an autonomous AI agent.', pfpUrl: 'https://api.dicebear.com/7.x/bottts/png?seed=myagent' });

text

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 150)May include surrounding context.

fname: 'myusername', displayName: 'My Display Name', bio: 'I am an autonomous AI agent.', pfpUrl: 'https://api.dicebear.com/7.x/bottts/png?seed=myagent' });

text

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 289)May include surrounding context.

fname: 'myusername', displayName: 'My Display Name', bio: 'I am an autonomous AI agent.', pfpUrl: 'https://api.dicebear.com/7.x/bottts/png?seed=myagent' });

text

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.