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Security audit

jovay-dapp-skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Jovay dApp development guide, but users should be careful with wallet use, private keys, and unpinned npm/template code.

Install only if you are comfortable running npm/Jovay development tooling. Use a disposable testnet wallet, verify you are on testnet before deployment, avoid pasting real private keys into shell commands, inspect any template scripts before running them, and prefer pinned dependencies or an isolated container.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:122
Finding

Unpinned Dependencies and Execution of Unreviewed Remote Template Code

Content
View full analysis
``` This clones the `EasyJovayDappTemplate` from GitHub and creates the project structure: ### 2.3 Install Dependencies ```bash cd # Install base deps (Hardhat, ethers, etc.) npm install # Install OpenZeppelin contracts (almost always needed) npm install @openzeppelin/contracts # If the template has an install script: # chmod +x tools/install_deps.sh && ./tools/install_deps.sh ``` ``` Related commands elsewhere in the file also execute dependency-provided tooling: ```bash npx hardhat compile npx hardhat test ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs the agent to clone a remotely maintained project template, install npm packages without exact version constraints, and optionally execute a shell script supplied by the cloned template. The reviewed skill contains neither the resulting lockfile nor the remote template and its `tools/install_deps.sh` file, so their effective behavior cannot be established from the audited artifact. An npm installation can execute package lifecycle hooks such as `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall`. Likewise, granting execute permission to and invoking `tools/install_deps.sh` permits the script to run arbitrary commands under the current user's account. Mutable package versions and mutable template branches allow executable content to change after this skill has been reviewed. Use of `npx` adds another supply-chain concern if the requested executable is not already installed locally, because `npx` may offer to download and execute a package from the configured npm registry. There is no evidence that the currently documented packages or remote template are malicious. The vu ...[truncated 1719 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:791
Finding

Deployment Private Key Exposed Through Shell Command Invocation

Content
View full analysis
" DEPLOYER_PRIVATE_KEY="" \ npx hardhat run scripts/deploy.js --network jovay_testnet ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented deployment example encourages placing the deployment private key directly in an interactive shell command. Although the value shown is a placeholder, users following the example may substitute a real key. Command text can be retained in shell history, terminal session recordings, CI logs, debugging output, clipboard history, or audit systems. Depending on the operating system and shell implementation, process metadata may also expose command or environment information to local monitoring tools or processes with sufficient permissions. A blockchain private key is a bearer credential: possession of it is sufficient to create valid signatures without an additional authentication check. Therefore, accidental disclosure cannot be mitigated merely by changing an application password. The associated account must be treated as compromised and its assets or authority migrated. ### Attack Path 1. A user replaces `` with an actual deployment key and executes the documented command. 2. The complete command is recorded in shell history, a terminal transcript, CI output, or another local logging facility. 3. A local user, compromised process, support operator, or party with access to those logs retrieves the key. 4. The attacker imports the key into a wallet or signing tool. 5. The attacker signs unauthorized transactions, transfers account assets, or performs privileged contract operations assigned to the deployment account. ### Impact Assessment Exploitation grants the attacker the full blockchain signing authority of the disclosed account. Depending on how that account ...[truncated 649 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (9)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.

├── hardhat.config.cjs # Hardhat configuration ├── package.json # Root package.json with Hardhat deps └── .jovay/ └── .env # JSON: { PROJECT_NAME, TEMPLATE_NAME }

text

### 2.3 Install Dependencies

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill walks users through wallet initialization, balance checks, airdrops, and deployment flows without an upfront warning that these steps may use a configured wallet and trigger blockchain interactions. In an agent setting, that omission can cause users to authorize actions they do not fully understand, especially when commands progress from setup to deployment in one workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The deployment section provides commands that will broadcast transactions and consume funds, but it does not clearly warn users at the point of action that deployment is state-changing and incurs gas costs. In a high-automation skill, this increases the chance of accidental transaction submission, misuse of a configured private key, or unintended spending even on testnet.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.