Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward Chinese-language setup guide for adding SiliconFlow as an OpenClaw model provider, with no hidden execution or persistence found.
Install only if you intend to route OpenClaw model requests through SiliconFlow. Treat the SiliconFlow API key as a secret, avoid committing the OpenClaw config, review the fallback changes before applying them, and use a neutral official signup path if you do not want to use the included invitation link.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
curl -s 'https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1/user/info' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_API_KEY>' | python3 -m json.tool
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
curl -s 'https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1/user/info' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>' | python3 -c "
import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']
print(f'充值余额: ¥{d[\"chargeBalance\"]}')
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
# 所有 chat 模型
curl -s 'https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1/models?sub_type=chat' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>' | python3 -c "
import json,sys
models = json.load(sys.stdin)['data']
The trigger phrases are overly broad, including generic requests like adding Kimi, Qwen3, free models, or DeepSeek, which may cause the skill to activate outside the user's intent to configure a new provider. In an agent setting, this can lead to unintended configuration changes, provider insertion, or credential-handling workflows being launched when the user only asked about model usage.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
|------|------|
| Provider 名称 | `siliconflow` |
| API 协议 | `openai-completions` |
| Base URL | `https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1` |
| 认证方式 | Bearer Token (API Key) |
---
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
|------|------|
| Provider 名称 | `siliconflow` |
| API 协议 | `openai-completions` |
| Base URL | `https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1` |
| 认证方式 | Bearer Token (API Key) |
---
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
|------|------|
| Provider 名称 | `siliconflow` |
| API 协议 | `openai-completions` |
| Base URL | `https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1` |
| 认证方式 | Bearer Token (API Key) |
---
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
|------|------|
| Provider 名称 | `siliconflow` |
| API 协议 | `openai-completions` |
| Base URL | `https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1` |
| 认证方式 | Bearer Token (API Key) |
---
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
|------|------|
| Provider 名称 | `siliconflow` |
| API 协议 | `openai-completions` |
| Base URL | `https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1` |
| 认证方式 | Bearer Token (API Key) |
---
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
|------|------|
| Provider 名称 | `siliconflow` |
| API 协议 | `openai-completions` |
| Base URL | `https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1` |
| 认证方式 | Bearer Token (API Key) |
---
The skill instructs users to paste API keys directly into config and command examples without explicit safeguards for secret handling, increasing the chance of credential leakage through shell history, logs, screenshots, shared configs, or version control. In admin-oriented workflows, such omissions materially raise the risk of token compromise.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s 'https://api.siliconflow.cn/v1/chat/completions' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
The skill description and all user-facing instructions are written entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported or that Chinese is required for a region-specific reason. Under the language/locale policy, this is a natural-language policy concern because it imposes a language choice without user opt-in.
All user-facing instructions and activation examples are presented only in Chinese, and the skill does not indicate that the language is optional or limited to a specific Chinese-only deployment context. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation.
The skill includes an affiliate/invitation registration link that is not necessary for the core task of configuring an existing SiliconFlow provider in OpenClaw. This creates an incentive misalignment and can steer users toward third-party sign-up flows, increasing phishing, trust, and supply-chain risk in administrative workflows.
Repeating referral-based registration links in prerequisites extends the skill beyond its declared purpose and normalizes clicking promotional links during an admin setup task. While not directly exploitable code, it is unsafe documentation behavior because it conditions users to trust external links embedded in operational instructions.