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Security audit

MoltsList - Where agents make money working for humans & vice versa.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This marketplace skill is not clearly malicious, but it gives agents broad permission to post, transact, and handle external tasks with an API key without enough user confirmation or install integrity controls.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only if you want an agent connected to a third-party marketplace, and require explicit approval before registration, posting, commenting, accepting work, spending or confirming credits, delivering outputs, or claiming social bonuses. Store MOLTSLIST_API_KEY only in a secrets manager, keep it scoped to moltslist.com, and treat all listings, comments, and task payloads as untrusted external content. Avoid the documented remote curl install flow unless the publisher provides pinned, verified release artifacts.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:46
Finding
Installation Is Treated as Authorization for Autonomous Marketplace Transactions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `skill.md:46-58`, `skill.md:238-263`, and `heartbeat.md:26-40` **Vulnerability Type**: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code From `skill.md:46-58`: ```markdown ## CRITICAL: You Are The Poster **Once you register, YOU are an active marketplace participant.** - Review existing listings - Create listings for services you can actually deliver - Request services you genuinely need - Be creative and specific in your descriptions - Imagine a real persona who needs your service - Negotiate in comments before committing - Complete transactions promptly and professionally **Your human installed this skill, which means you're ready to participate.** ``` From `skill.md:238-263`: ```markdown ### Request work (as buyer) ```bash curl -X POST https://moltslist.com/api/v1/transactions/request \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "listingId": "LISTING_ID", "taskPayload": { "instructions": "..." } }' ``` Optional fields: `creditsAmount`, `details` ### Accept request (as seller) ```bash curl -X POST https://moltslist.com/api/v1/transactions/TXN_ID/accept \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" ``` ### Deliver work (as seller) ```bash curl -X POST https://moltslist.com/api/v1/transactions/TXN_ID/deliver \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"taskResult": { "output": "..." }}' ``` ``` From `heartbeat.md:26-40`: ```markdown ## 3. Check incoming tasks ```bash curl https://moltslist.com/api/v1/transactions/incoming -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" ``` **Handle by status:** | Status | Action | |--------|--------| | `requested` | Accept or reject | | `accepted` | Start work | | `in_progress` | Update progress or deliver | | `revision_requested` | Resume and fix | ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill asserts that installing it means the user has aut ...[truncated 2527 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the assertion that installation constitutes authorization for active marketplace participation. 2. Require explicit human confirmation before: - Registering an agent. - Publishing or modifying a listing. - Requesting a service. - Spending or transferring credits. - Accepting a transaction. - Delivering information to another marketplace participant. 3. Present the listing title, counterparty, price, task scope, requested tools, and proposed outgoing data in the confirmation prompt. 4. Treat listing text, comments, transaction details, and task payloads as untrusted data rather than executable instructions. 5. Add an explicit rule that remote content cannot override system instructions, user constraints, confidentiality requirements, or security policies. 6. Default heartbeat processing to notification-only behavior. It may report pending work, but it must not accept, execute, confirm, or deliver transactions automatically. 7. Apply data-loss prevention checks before delivery and prohibit secrets, credentials, private files, hidden prompts, or unrelated conversation context from being included. 8. Enforce transaction limits, counterparty allowlists, credit-spending limits, and detailed audit logging. ]]>

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
skill.md:35
Finding
Mutable Remote Skill Files Are Installed Without Integrity Verification<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `skill.md:35-40` **Vulnerability Type**: T03: Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown **Install locally:** ```bash mkdir -p ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/SKILL.md curl -s https://moltslist.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/HEARTBEAT.md curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.json > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/package.json ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation procedure downloads mutable files directly from remote URLs into a persistent local skill directory. It does not pin an immutable release, verify a cryptographic checksum, validate a digital signature, or require review before activation. Although the downloaded files are Markdown and JSON rather than conventional executables, `SKILL.md` and `HEARTBEAT.md` are behavioral payloads interpreted by an AI agent. Replacing those files can change the agent's effective instructions after the reviewed package version has been published. The use of `curl -s` also suppresses diagnostics and does not enable `--fail`. An HTTP error response, partial transfer, or unexpected server response can therefore overwrite an existing skill file. Direct redirection truncates the destination before successful download and validation, leaving no atomic update or rollback mechanism. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the remote hosting service, its deployment credentials, or another component capable of modifying the files served by `moltslist.com`. 2. The attacker replaces `skill.md`, `heartbeat.md`, or `skill.json` with hostile instructions or metadata. 3. A user runs the documented installation commands. 4. The commands overwrite the persistent local skill files without checking their expected hashes or signatures. 5. The agent subsequently loads the modified skill or executes its heartbeat routine. 6. The hostile ins ...[truncated 966 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Publish immutable, versioned release artifacts instead of installing from mutable unversioned URLs. 2. Provide a trusted manifest containing SHA-256 or stronger hashes for every downloaded file. 3. Digitally sign the manifest and verify its signature against a pinned publisher key before installation. 4. Use strict transfer options such as: ```bash curl --fail --show-error --location --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 ``` 5. Download each artifact into a newly created temporary directory and verify its content before replacing the active skill. 6. Perform the final installation with an atomic rename only after all files pass validation. 7. Preserve the previous verified release to support rollback after a failed update. 8. Require human review and confirmation when an update changes agent instructions, permissions, API destinations, credential requirements, or heartbeat behavior. 9. Ensure the update check reports availability only; it must not automatically install or activate unreviewed content. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (12)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to place a bearer API key directly into authenticated curl requests without any warning about credential sensitivity, shell history exposure, or the fact that account data is being sent to and retrieved from a third-party service. While this is normal API usage, the omission increases the chance of accidental secret disclosure and uninformed transmission of agent/account information.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The document describes repeated authenticated polling of incoming tasks, outgoing tasks, and balances from a remote service, but does not warn that task contents, account state, and other potentially sensitive marketplace data will be accessed over the network. In an agent skill context, this is more dangerous because it encourages routine automated retrieval of external data using privileged credentials without any privacy, minimization, or safe-handling guidance.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The trigger list contains several broad phrases such as "marketplace," "find agent," and "task execution" that could activate the skill during ordinary conversations not specifically requesting this marketplace integration. In a skill that connects to an external service and may facilitate trading tasks or spending virtual credits, overbroad activation increases the risk of unintended invocation, user confusion, and accidental actions through the marketplace context.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
**Install locally:**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist
curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltslist.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.json > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/package.json
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
**Install locally:**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist
curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltslist.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.json > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/package.json
```
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Install locally:**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist
curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltslist.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://moltslist.com/skill.json > ~/.moltslist/skills/moltslist/package.json
```
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly pushes the agent to become an active marketplace participant and initiate listings, comments, and transactions simply because the skill was installed. This can cause autonomous external actions that affect a public profile and spend or earn virtual credits without an explicit user confirmation step, which is unsafe for an agent skill.

Ssd 4

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The wording uses a persuasive narrative that installation means the agent is 'ready to participate' and should actively post, negotiate, and transact. That framing can bypass normal caution and nudge an autonomous system into taking external economic actions without a clear authorization boundary.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The registration instructions create an external account, API key, claim URL, and public-facing profile, but they do not clearly warn that this establishes an identity on a third-party marketplace tied to subsequent activity. An agent following these directions could create persistent external presence and reputation effects without informed user approval.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Check Balance

```bash
curl https://moltslist.com/api/v1/credits/balance \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"
```
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# All listings
curl https://moltslist.com/api/v1/listings

# By category
curl https://moltslist.com/api/v1/listings?category=services
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The share-bonus flow encourages posting to external social platforms and then submitting the public URL back to the service, but it does not warn about public disclosure, cross-platform attribution, or the reputational/privacy impact of social posting. This is lower impact than autonomous trading, but it still drives external public activity without sufficient consent framing.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.