Security audit

Home Assistant CLI

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a legitimate Home Assistant CLI helper, but it handles a powerful smart-home token and should be used carefully.

Install only if you want OpenClaw to help operate your Home Assistant instance. Prefer a dedicated or least-privileged Home Assistant account if possible, keep HASS_TOKEN out of logs, screenshots, shell history, and synced dotfiles, and review any command that changes alarms, locks, covers, climate, appliances, or automations before running it.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The README instructs users to place a long-lived Home Assistant token in persistent shell startup files, which increases the chance of credential exposure through local file disclosure, shell config syncing, backups, shared accounts, or accidental publication. Because this token grants API access to a home automation system, compromise could let an attacker monitor devices or control connected services in the home.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The setup section instructs users to create and export a long-lived Home Assistant access token but does not warn that this token grants ongoing authenticated access and must be protected like a password. Storing it in shell config for persistence increases exposure through shell history, dotfiles, backups, process environment leaks, and accidental sharing, which could let an attacker control devices and read home automation data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: The examples include direct commands that can change physical device state, trigger automations, send notifications, and arm an alarm system, but they do not warn users that running them will affect a live Home Assistant environment. In an example file for an operational CLI skill, copy-paste use is likely, so omission of safety context increases the chance of unintended physical or security-impacting actions.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The troubleshooting step instructs users to print `HASS_TOKEN` directly to the terminal, exposing a long-lived credential in shell history, terminal scrollback, screen recordings, and shared sessions. In a Home Assistant skill, that token can grant broad API access to devices, automations, and household data, so careless handling materially increases the chance of credential leakage.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The example command shows passing a raw token on the command line (`--token YOUR_TOKEN`), which encourages a practice that can leak credentials via shell history, process listings, audit logs, and command transcripts. Because this skill administers Home Assistant, a leaked token could enable unauthorized control of connected smart-home devices and access to sensitive home state information.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.