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Security audit

UXC Skill Creator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a coherent UXC wrapper-creation purpose, but it under-scopes user-controlled endpoint probing and shell-style command examples in ways users should review before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent probing provider endpoints through UXC. Use it with trusted endpoints, avoid private or local network targets unless intentional, and require validation/escaping of host values before running generated shell commands.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:28
Finding

Shell command injection through unvalidated endpoint interpolation

Content
View full analysis
-h` ``` The generated template in `references/templates.md:23-27` repeats the unsafe pattern: ```markdown 1. Confirm endpoint/protocol/auth from user host: - search official docs for canonical endpoint and auth requirements - probe with `uxc -h` (and endpoint variants if needed) 2. Use fixed link command by default: - `command -v ` - If missing, create it: `uxc link ` ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill explicitly starts with a raw, user-provided endpoint and places that value into shell-oriented command examples. It does not require URL parsing, character validation, shell escaping, or execution through an argument-vector API. If an Agent replaces `` or `` with attacker-controlled text and executes the rendered command through a shell, shell metacharacters can terminate the intended `uxc` argument and introduce another command. Quoting alone would not be sufficient unless quoting and escaping are implemented consistently for the target shell. The validator also checks only whether these command patterns appear in generated documentation. It does not enforce safe endpoint validation or safe process invocation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker supplies a crafted endpoint containing shell syntax, such as a URL followed by a command separator and an atta ...[truncated 1123 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/workflow.md:5
Finding

Arbitrary endpoint probing permits SSRF-style internal network access

Content
View full analysis
-h` ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow requires runtime requests to endpoint candidates derived from user input but does not restrict destination schemes, resolved IP ranges, ports, redirects, or DNS behavior. Consequently, the Agent may act as a network proxy into environments that are reachable from the Agent but inaccessible to the requesting user. Searching official documentation does not adequately mitigate this issue because the runtime destination remains user-controlled. The instructions also encourage probing path variants, which can increase the number of requests made to the target. Relevant prohibited destinations commonly include loopback, private, link-local, multicast, unspecified, and cloud metadata addresses. Validation must occur after DNS resolution and again after redirects to prevent DNS rebinding and redirect-based bypasses. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker provides an endpoint that resolves to an internal service, loopback address, link-local service, or cloud metadata addres ...[truncated 1328 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
- `SKILL.md`

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

md
## See Also

- Base execution and protocol/auth guidance:
  - `skills/uxc/SKILL.md`

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/validation-rules.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md
- removed input flags or deprecated invocation forms
- raw JSON passed through `--args`
- dynamic runtime command renaming for link conflicts
- protocol/path/auth assumptions made without verification

## OAuth and error handling boundary