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Security audit

Mdorigin

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward mdorigin usage guide; its main risk is an unpinned npm install, not hidden or malicious behavior.

Prefer a project-local, pinned mdorigin version for important projects, and run Cloudflare deployment commands only when you intend to publish or sync those assets. Review the mdorigin package and docs if your environment contains sensitive deployment credentials.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 13–19
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
npm install -g mdorigin
bash
npm install --save-dev mdorigin

Technical Analysis

Both installation commands resolve mdorigin without specifying an exact reviewed version or integrity value. This causes npm to retrieve whichever release the configured registry currently considers appropriate. The audited project contains no lockfile, checksum, vendored implementation, or package provenance information that would make the installed artifact reproducible and independently verifiable.

npm packages may execute lifecycle scripts during installation. Consequently, compromise of the package, its publishing account, or the configured registry could result in attacker-controlled code running with the permissions of the user executing the command. The global installation option further increases exposure by placing the resulting executable on the user's global command path.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the mdorigin package, its publisher account, or the package source used by the configured npm registry.
  2. The attacker publishes or serves a malicious release.
  3. A user or agent follows the documented unpinned installation command.
  4. npm resolves and downloads the malicious release.
  5. Malicious package lifecycle logic may execute during installation; the installed CLI may also execute attacker-controlled behavior when subsequently invoked.
  6. In the global-installation case, the attacker-controlled executable remains available through the user's global command path until removed.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation could provide code execution with the privileges of the user running npm. Depending on that user's environment, the malicious package could read or modify accessible project files, source code, ...[truncated 357 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin mdorigin to an exact version that has been reviewed, rather than relying on the latest registry release.
  • Prefer project-local installation over global installation to reduce command-path exposure and improve dependency isolation.
  • Commit an npm lockfile and use npm ci for reproducible installations.
  • Record and verify the expected npm registry, package publisher, provenance, and integrity metadata.
  • Review the package's source, transitive dependencies, and lifecycle scripts before approving upgrades.
  • Perform dependency installation in a restricted build environment without unnecessary credentials.
  • Establish a controlled update process that reviews and tests each new version before changing the pin.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.