T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
install.sh:107- Finding
Unverified Remote Homebrew Installer Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
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/dev/null; then echo -e "${YELLOW}⚠️ Homebrew is not installed; installing it now...${NC}" /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer downloads shell code from a mutable remote URL and passes the response directly to `/bin/bash`. The URL belongs to Homebrew's official GitHub repository rather than a personal paste service, but this does not eliminate the underlying risk: - The URL references `HEAD`, so the effective code can change after this Skill has been reviewed. - No version, commit hash, checksum, or cryptographic signature is verified. - The response cannot be inspected before it executes. - Trust is transitively placed in GitHub, the Homebrew repository, DNS, TLS certificate authorities, and the network path. - A failed or compromised upstream response becomes arbitrary local shell code. Installing Homebrew is not strictly required to generate audio. The Skill only needs `ffmpeg` and `edge-tts`, and it could instead stop and provide manual dependency instructions. Automatically bootstrapping an entire package manager exceeds the minimum action necessary for the declared TTS functionality. ### Attack Path 1. A user runs `./install.sh --install` on macOS. 2. The script determines that `brew` is unavailable. 3. The mutable Homebrew installer at the upstream `HEAD` revision is requested. 4. An upstream compromise, account compromise, or network trust failure changes the returned script. 5. The response is immediately executed by `/bin/bash` without integrity verification or user review. 6. The downloaded code obtains the privileges of the invoking user and may request administrative authorization as part of instal ...[truncated 584 chars]- Remediation
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